Anxiety and Safety: Two Studies ol the Kentucky Coal Miner by Dickinson, George E. & Sprague, Stuart Seely
ANXIETY AND SAFETY: TWO STUDIES OF 
THE KENTUCKY COAL MINER 
Death Perceptions of Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners 
by George E. Dickinson 
Mining Safety: Rallying Cry or Creed? 
by Stuart Seely Sprague 
Research Report No. 10 
Appalachian Development Center 
Morehead State University 
Morehead, Kentucky 
APPALACHIAN DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 
Morehead State University 
The purpose of this series is to provide a forum for the dissemination of significant 
scholarly work concerned with environmental, economic, educational, and social issues 
affecting Appalachia, with particular emphasis on Eastern Kentucky. A special focus of 
the series is the development of possible courses of action for the region. 
Copies of any of the reports in this series are available upon request. Any individual or 
organization wishing to be on the mailing list for future reports should so indicate. Any 
general comments on the series or scholarly contributions which meet the guidelines 
for this series should be forwarded to: Appalachian Development Center Research 
Report Series, Appalachian Development Center, Morehead State University, Morehead, 
Kentucky 40351 , telephone (606) 783-2077. 
The Cover: The painting " Coal Miner" is an original wwatercolor by Kentucky artist Mitchell Tolle. Full col-
or prints are available (15" x 24", signed and numbered) from Tolle Gallery. You may purchase the print by 
sending $55 postage paid to Tolle Gal lery, P.O. Box 444, Berea, Kentucky 40403. 
Reports in this Series 
An Analysis of Populaton Changes in Eastern Kentucky 1970-2000 by Gary Cox, June 
1979. (Research Report Number 1.) 
The lchthyofauna of the Big Sandy River Basin with Special Emphasis on the Levisa 
Fork Drainage by Jerry Howell, January 1981. (Research Report Number 2.) 
The Impact of Federal Regulations on the Small Coal Mine in Appalachia by Bernard 
Davis, November 1981. (Research Report Number 3.) 
Fiscal Effort in Eastern Kentucky: Implications for Financing Public Services by Douglas 
Dotterweich, March 1982. (Research Report Number 4.) 
Current and Projected Socioeconomic Conditions of the Levisa Fork of the Big Sandy 
River Basin in Kentucky and Virginia by Gary Cox, August 1982. (Research Report 
Number 5.) 
Macroinvertebrates of the Big Sandy River Basin with Special Emphasis on the Levisa 
Fork by Gerald DeMoss, January 1983. (Research Report Number 6.) 
Business Opportunities Within Appalachia Kentucky: A Threshold Population Study by 
Robert Justice, May 1983. (Research Report Number 7.) 
Geologic Structure and Mine Roof Falls in Selected Coal Beds Within Appalachia by 
David Hylbert, March 1984. (Research Report Number 8.) 
Appalachian Kentucky's Economy During the Mid 70's and Early B0's by Douglas Dot-
terweich, October 1984. (Research Report Number 9.) 
Anxiety & Safety: Two Studies of the Kentucky Coal Miner, 1. Death Perceptions of 
Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners by George E. Dickinson, 2. Mine Safety: Rallying Cry or 
Creed? by Stuart Seely Sprague, October 1985. (Research Report Number 10.) 
Anxiety and Safety: Two Studies ol 
the Kentucky Coal Miner 
Death Perceptions of Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners 
by George E. Dickinson 
Former Head, Department of Sociology, 
Social Work, & Corrections 
Morehead State University 
Mine Safety: Rallying Cry or Creed? 
by Stuart Seely Sprague 
Professor of History 
Morehead State University 
Research Report No. 1 0 
APPALACHIAN DEVELOPMENT CENTER 
Morehead State University 
Morehead, Kentucky 
February 1986 
Table of Contents 
Page 
Preface ................... . ............................. . ....... v 
Death Perceptions of Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners 
ABSTRACT .................. . .............. .. ......... .. ...... vii 
INTRODUCTION .................. .. ..... . .. ........... ...... .... 1 
Frequency of Mining Acc idents .......... .. ............... . .. . . 1 
Causes of Mining Accidents ................................... 1 
METHODOLOGY ..................... .. .. . ....... . ....... . ...... . 4 
The Interview . . ......................... ... .......... ...... . . 4 
Characteristics of the Sample .................................. 4 
Means of Analysis of Death Anxiety ....... .. .................... 5 
FINDINGS ............................. .... ........... .......... 6 
Responsibility for and Causes of Mine Acc idents ........... ...... 7 
Death Anxiety ............ . .................. . ..... . ......... 8 
ATTITUDINAL SURVEY OF EASTERN KENTUCKY COAL MINERS .... .. 12 
CONCLUSIONS ....................... . ..... . . ................ . . 15 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................. ... 16 
Mining Safety: Rallying Cry or Creed? ........................ 18 
CONCLUSIONS AND THOUG HTS .......................... ..... . . 52 
List of Tables 
Table 1. 
Page 
Job Titles of the 78 Coal Miners ......... . .......... . ..... 4 
Table 2. Responsibil ity for Mine Safety by Working Status 




Responsibility for Mine Safety by Age of Miners ............ 6 
Responsibili ty for Mine Safety by Years Worked ............ 7 
Cause of Most Mining Accidents by Working Status 




Cause of Most Mining Accidents by Age of Miners .......... 8 
Cause of Most Mining Accidents by Years Worked ... . ...... 8 




Death Anxiety by Age of Miners .......................... 9 
Death Anxiety by Working Status of Miners ................ 9 
Death Anxiety by Response to the Question " I Consider 
Table 12. 
Table 13. 
Myself to be a Religious Person" ......... . .. . .. . ....... 10 
Death Anxiety by Fear of Black Lu ng Disease ...... ....... 10 
Death Anxiety by Frequency of Thoughts 
of Mining Accidents ......... . ................... . .... 11 
Table 14. Death Anxiety by Frequency of Thoughts of One's Health ... 11 
Preface 
Two reports offer insight into the personality and working conditions of 
the Kentucky Coal miner. 
Dr. George E. Dickinson's survey measures death anxiety among miners; 
Dr. Stuart S. Sprague's correlated report tracks the often volatile effort to 
legislate and enforce safety regulations. 
Both reports arrive at one perhaps startling conclusion: many miners 
agree-and are somewhat supported by stat istics-that they themselves 
are most frequently to blame for accidents. 
Are coal miners fatalistic, or simply realistic about the dangers of work-
ing underground? These two reports explore the answers to that question, 
and offer suggestions for increased safety awareness programs. 
Garry Barker, Editor 
Abstract 
Coal mining is among the most hazardous of occupations in the United 
States today. Yet, thousands of men and women hold jobs in the coal fields. 
This study is concerned with coal miners primarily in Eastern Kentucky and 
some in West Virginia. 
The major objectives were to ascertain who causes mining accidents and 
to relate death anxiety of coal miners to various independent variables. 
Data was gathered through interview schedules with 78 miners. Most 
miners blame themselves and other miners for mining accidents and feel 
that miners are most responsible for mine safety. While the majority of 
respondents had a relatively high death anxiety as measured by the 
Templer Death Anxiety Scale, miners tend to look out for each other and 
maintain a strong sense of social solidarity. 
Death Perceptions of Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners 
By George E. Dickinson 
Introduction 
Coal mining is a way of life in Eastern Kentucky. Historically, coal has 
been king in the mountains of Eastern Kentucky. Like farming , however, 
coal mining has its ups and downs, its good and bad years, its booms and 
busts. Whether in fat or lean years, coal remains the vital heartbeat of the 
region. 
Frequency of Mining Accidents 
Coal mining, however, has a reputation as an unhealthy occupation. 
Some studies have found that coal miners die at twice the rate of other 
manual workers from tuberculosis, general arteriosclerosis, other myocar-
dial degeneratives, cancer of the prostate, ulcer of the stomach, accidents 
and homicide (Althouse, 1974). Their mortal ity is four times that of the 
general population. It is estimated that one of ten miners will meet death as 
a result of black lung. 
The coal industry is characterized by a number of potential accident 
sources. The miner is faced with the possibility of such dangers as a roof 
cave-in, a rock fall , f looding, an explosion due to methane buildup or a 
90,000-pound continuous miner suddenly turning against the operator. 
Studies indicate that miners must work with heavy, complicated equipment 
beneath tons of earth in a confined, poorly lighted, noisy environment 
(Althouse, 1974). In 1981, for every 2.5 million hours worked in underground 
and surface mining a miner died (Brown, 1982). The death-rate figure for the 
United States for 1981 in coal mining was 0.08 (based on the number of 
mine fatalities per 200,000 employee hours) according to the federal Mine 
Safety and Health Administration. Kentucky's 1981 death rate in mining 
was 0.11 (Brown, 1982). 
Deaths in coal mines today occur less often than a few decades ago as 
the count has dropped to less than 200 annually compared to a thousand or 
more per year in the 1940's (Bowman, 1982). Others report that the rate of 
bituminous coal mine fatalities per million hours worked in mines between 
1932 and 1976 declined from 1.7 in 1932 to 0.4 in 1976 (Lewis-Beck and 
Alford, 1980). 
Causes of Mining Accidents 
Lewis-Beck and Alford conclude that mine safety laws have led to a 
decline in fatality rates. Likewise, Perry (1981) concludes from his analysis 
of coal mine fatal ity rates from 1930 to 1979 that strong safety laws reduce 
coal mine fatal ities and that, if laws are stringent, coal mine fatalities 
decrease with increases in federal spending on mine health and safety. 
While Lewis-Beck and Alford show that fatality rates vary with the safety 
law in force, this is not consistent with the idea that miners' carelessness 
is the major cause of fatalities since the fatality rate would be more ran-
dom. Perry further notes that mine safety spending has been strongly 
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related to fatality rates when laws were effective-this is also inconsistent 
with the idea that carelessness causes fatalities. 
Individuals like Senator Harrison Smith of New Mexico, however, believe 
that most mine accidents are due to individual carelessness (Brown, 1981). 
Some suggest that the people of Appalachia tend to have the attitude of 
" what will be, will be"-an attitude of fatalism (Latz, 1958; Lucas, 1969; 
Weller, 1965; Debusman, 1962). As Debusman notes, death is the end of 
earthly life and the beginning of eternal life; there is no fear of death if 
prepared. Perry (1981) states that perhaps many miners have died because 
of carelessness. The dangerous working conditions in the coal industry 
often cause fatalities to be the result of occupational carelessness. Such 
careless behavior is unlikely to entail such grave consequences for per-
sons in other occupations. 
Althouse (1974) says that while miners are aware of the dangers, they feel 
powerless to alter the course of future events. Therefore, to release tension 
about the dangers of the mines, some miners react by " putting it (danger) 
out of mind" through horseplay, joking, and story telling. 
Whether mine accidents are due to bad luck, chance, or miners' errors, 
the notion of fatalism frequently portrays the people of Appalachia. They 
are stereotyped as stoic and tight-lipped, meekly accepting life as it is, 
powerless to affect change (Dunlop, 1982). 
Parker (1969) notes that hardships have dimmed the hopes of southern 
Appalachians, and fatalism has been a buffer against disappointment. 
Everyday happenings-good and tragic-become the "wi ll of God," and 
the only hope seems to be the world beyond. Parker argues that fatalism 
and traditionalism, however, are receding. He suggests that people in the 
lower economic group have stronger feelings concerning fatalism. He also 
states that while fatalism has roots in rigid Calvinism, it is difficult to deter-
mine if its continued popularity is based on that, frequent hardships, or 
both. Thinking that God causes everything does resolve many problems in 
life. Roberts (1977) finds that the rural people of Appalachia hold a fatalistic 
view of death notable for its apparent absence of death fear. 
Stereotypes are often based upon false impressions. Several (Ford, 1962; 
Lewis, 1970; Ross, 1971) have challenged this interpretation of the miners' 
attitude as fatalistic. Chiappone and Kroes (1979) in a study of West 
Virginia miners conclude that miners are not fatalistic. They argue that the 
miner keeps working in a potentially hazardous occupation in spite of the 
stress because this is the best paying job in the area. 
Ross (1971) disagrees that coal miners stay in the mines just because it 
is their best paying option. He argues that they have a proud sense of oc-
cupational identity-an identity lacking in other industrial workers and one 
which extends to ex-miners. He suggests that many select coal mining for 
the following reasons: 
(1) pride in their work as craftsmen 
(2) considerable freedom and little direct supervision in the mines 
(3) avoidance of the boredom of identical factory work 
(4) achievement of esprit de corps of the mine face crew 
(5) less worker alienation from the product 
(6) development of social solidarity recognizing individualism 
(7) upward mobility potential 
(8) adventuresome spirit in opening and developing territory never seen 
before. 
Althouse (1974) notes from his survey of miners that many accidents 
result from human errors or a breakdown in safety procedures. Thus, a 
fatalism that blames miners' deaths on miners' carelessness seems to be a 
significant attitude among many related to coal mining (Perry and Ritter, 
1981). Another survey of over 600 underground miners in 1976 by 
Westinghouse Behavioral Services Center (Dunlop, 1982) concluded that 
miners are not fatalistic and feel they have some control over their destiny. 
Instead of fatalism, the Westinghouse study reported "being careless and 
not following safety rules, just not giving a damn and not using good com-
mon sense and judgement" as leading to mine accidents. 
"If we think miners are going to be sate, eventually they are. If we think 
they are going to be killed, then more will be," said Joseph Brennan, presi-
dent of the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (Dunlop, 1982). Bren-
nan's quote fits the social psychologist W.I. Thomas' "definition of the 
situation"-define a situation as real and it becomes real in its conse-
quences. If one believes mine fatalities are due to carelessness of miners, a 
strong incentive to improve safety conditions will be lacking. Thus, there 
will be accidents-and more deaths. 
Behavioral scientists could increase our understanding of how coal 
miners face unpredictable dangers on a daily basis (Ross, 1971). Ross 
notes that the belief in one's buddies in this dangerous environment is part 
of the " web of verbal history, folklore and legend" which also has to do with 
an overall sense of security. By contributing to a better understanding of 
the coal miner's unique combination of occupational and biographical 
characteristics, the behavioral scientist can help relate death anxiety in 
this hazardous field. The miner must deny in a personal way-as does a 
combat soldier-that death or a serious personal injury will occur. Ross 
argues that considerable social significance results from coal miners' sup-
portive factors as among soldiers. The thought, that if anything happens in 
the mines one's buddies will soon be engaged in ceaseless rescue efforts, 
is at the heart of the interdependent morale system in which everyone 
underground takes part. 
Platt and Black (1978) suggest that studies are especially needed which 
examine individual and group beliefs regarding death and dying in a variety 
of occupational and situational settings rather than the traditional 
medically-oriented surveys. This work will involve interviews with coal 
miners to address two specific issues. Miners will be asked for their 
perceptions of the causes of mine accidents, and their death anxiety will be 
measured. This information will provide a basis for a better understanding 





Data for this study were gathered through interview schedules using an 
instrument composed of 38 questions (see p. 12). The miners were inter-
viewed in Pike and Martin counties in Southeastern Kentucky in 1981 and 
1982 and in Southwestern West Virginia in Mingo County in 1981. The ma-
jority worked underground; some were surface miners. A snowbal l samp-
ling techn ique was used-coal miners would suggest other miners to inter-
view and they in turn would suggest others. A total of 78 miners completed 
the interview schedule. 
Characteristics of the Sample 
Job titles of the miners (71 male and 7 female) varied considerably as can 
be seen in Table 1. The most frequently named job was " foreman" (boss) 
with "maintenance" being second and "electrician" third. Whi le two of the 
seven women were clerks, the other five held traditionally-occupied male 
jobs. 
Table 1. Job Titles of the 78 Coal Miners* 
Title of Job 
1. Belt line Operator 
2. Bulldozer Operator 
3. Chisolm Miner 
4. Clerk 
5. Crusher Operator 




10. Grease Machinery 
11 . Loader Operator 
12. Maintenance 
13. Mine Operator 
14. Pumper 
15. Repair Machinery 
16. Roof Bolter 
17. Scoop Operator 
18. Shuttle Car Operator 
19. Superintendent 






















•The seven females were drill operators (2), shuttle car operators (2), sur-
face supervisor (1), and clerks (2). 
The age of the miners ranged from 20 to 75 with the average age being 37 
years. The number of years worked in the coal mines ranged from 2 to 40 
with the average being 11.4. Educational background was 47 percent with 
less than a high school diploma, 36 percent with a high school diploma, and 
17 percent with some college work or a college degree. Eighty-three per-
cent of the miners interviewed were working at the time, and 17 percent 
were unemployed or retired. 
Seventy-four percent of the respondents were married at the time; the 
others were single (13 percent), widowed (10 percent), or divorced (3 per-
cent). Of those married, 75 percent had a spouse not working outside the 
home, 18 percent had spouses working full-time, and 7 percent had part-
time working spouses. The number of dependents ranged from none to 5 
with the average being 1.55. 
Means of Analysis of Death Anxiety 
The Templer Death Anx iety Scale, consisting of 15 statements, was used 
to determine the degree of death anxiety of the miners. Each interviewee 
was asked to respond with "True" or " False" to each statement. The state-
ments are listed below: 
1. T I am very much afraid to die. 
2. F The thought of death seldom enters my mind. 
3. F It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death. 
4. T I dread to think about having to have an operation. 
5. F I am not at all afraid to die. 
6. F I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer. 
7. F The thought of death never bothers me. 
8. T I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly. 
9. T I fear dying a painful death. 
10. T The subject of life after death troubles me greatly. 
11. T I am really scared of having a heart attack. 
12. T I often think about how short life really is. 
13. T I shudder when I hear people talking about a World War Ill. 
14. T The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me. 
15. F I feel that the future holds nothing for me to fear. 
If the respondent answered all 15 items as marked above, a total score of 
15 would result as they are coded with a " 1 ". This would indicate high death 
anxiety. Completely opposite answers to the above would yield a score of 
30 as they are coded with a "2" and would suggest low death anxiety. Thus, 
with a range of possible composite scores of 15 to 30, the midpoint of the 
range, 23, was the breaking point. Respondents with composite scores less 
than 23 had " high anxiety"; those with scores of 23 or higher had "low anx-
iety" . 
The Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) was tested by 0 .1. Templer (1970) for 
reliability and validity. Internal consistency of the 15 items and test-retest 
reliability were determined. The validity of the DAS was investigated by two 
separate procedures and found to be acceptable. 
Dependent variables were death anxiety as measured by the DAS and 
mining accident cause and responsibility. Independent variables were 
years worked in the mine, current work status, age, fear of black lung 
disease, religion, frequency of thoughts on one's health, and having an ac-
cident. The Chi-square test was used to determine if the distributions were 





Responsibility for and Causes of Mine Accidents 
When asked, "Who is most responsible for mine safety?", the majority of 
miners (72 percent) state that miners are responsible (see Table 2). The 
others (28 percent) responded that the boss or company operator is respon-
sible for safety in the mines. 
Table 2. Responsibility for Mine Safety 
by Working Status of Miners 
(Percents in Parentheses) 




Myself/Other Miners Boss/Company Operator 
45 (76) 
7 (54) 




When relating responsibility for mine safety with working status of 
miners, age of miners and years worked, no statistically significant dif-
ferences were found (see Tables 2-4). Though not statistically significant, 
non-miners were split on mine safety responsibility with about half stating 
"miners" are responsible and the other half naming bosses and company 
operators (see Table 2). 
Table 3. Responsibility for Mine Safety 
by Age of Miners (Percents in Parentheses) 




Myself/Other Miners Boss/Company Operator 
25 (74) 
27 (71) 




Table 4. Responsibility for Mine Safety 
by Years Worked (Percents in Parentheses) 




Myself/Other Miners Boss/Company Operator 
25 (76) 
27 (69) 




While the majority of miners responded that most mining accidents are 
caused by miners (62 percent), others (23 percent) felt that lack of mine 
safety features caused accidents, while others (15 percent) felt that mining 
accidents are inevitable (see Tables 5-7). When causes of mining accidents 
were related to miners' working status, age, and years worked, statistically 
significant differences were found (see Tables 5-7). Over one-third of older 
miners and those having worked the longest stated that most mining ac-
cidents were caused by lack of mine safety features, whereas less than ten 
percent of younger miners and those working less than nine years in the 
mines blamed lack of mine safety features (see Tables 6-7). On the other 
hand, almost a fourth of younger miners and those working less than nine 
years said mining accidents were inevitable, whereas only seven percent of 
older miners and those working nine or more years stated such. Non-
working miners more often blamed accidents on lack of mine safety 
features (61 percent) whereas working miners (68 percent) blamed miners 
(see Table 5). 
Table 5. Cause of Most Mining Accidents by 
Working Status of Miners* 
(Percents in Parentheses) 
Current Working Status Causes of Most Mining Accidents 
Working 
Not Working 
Lack of Mine 






1 ( 8) 
*While the Chi-square test revealed significance at the .0015 level, 33 per-
cent of the cells had expected frequencies of less than 5. 
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Table 6. Cause of Most Mining Accidents by 
Age of Miners (Percents in Parentheses) 
Age in Years Causes of Most Mining Accidents 
Lack of Mine 
20-33 
34-75 




X2= 18.516 df =2 
1 ( 2) 
17 (43) 
p = .0001 
Table 7. Cause of Most Mining Accidents by 
Years Worked (Percents in Parentheses) 
9 (24) 
3 ( 7) 
Years Worked Causes of Most Mining Accidents 




Miner's Errors Safety Features Inevitable 
25 (68) 
23 (56) 
X2 = 10.907 df=2 
3 ( 8) 
15 (37) 
p = .0043 
9 (24) 
3 ( 7) 
Death Anxiety 
Death anxiety as measured by the Death Anxiety Scale (DAS) did not 
show statistically significant differences by number of years worked in the 
mines. As noted in Table 8, while approximately two-thirds (69 percent) of 
the miners had a high death anxiety and one-third (31 percent) low anxiety, 
there were no differences by number of years worked in the mines (equal to 
or less than 8 or greater than 8). 
Table 8. Death Anxiety by Years Worked 
(Percents in Parentheses) 







df = 1 p=NS 
11 (33) 
10 (29) 
When age is related to death anxiety, no statistically significant relation-
ship is shown (see Table 9). However, a slightly greater percent of younger 
miners (less than 34 years of age) have a high death anxiety (76 percent) 
than older miners (equal to or greater than 34 years of age) have (62 
percent). 
Table 9. Death Anxiety by Age of Miners 
(Percents in Parentheses) 
Age in Years Death Anxiety 
20-33 
34-75 





df = 1 p=NS 
8 (24) 
13 (38) 
Current working status (82 percent were working at the time of the 
survey) of the miners also did not reveal statistically significant differences 
by death anxiety scores. While the number of non-working miners is too 
small to draw valid conclusions, a greater percentage of non-working 
miners (83 percent) had a high death anxiety than did working miners (65 
percent). (See Table 10). 
Table 10. Death Anxiety by Working 
Status of Miners (Percents in Parentheses)* 








*Twenty-two percent of the cells had expected frequencies of less than 
5, thus a Chi-square test cannot be used, N = 67. 
When asked if they considered themselves to be religious, 60 percent 
agreed (see Table 11). While not statistically signi ficant, 74 percent of those 
who subjectively evaluated themselves as religious also had a high death 
anxiety as compared to 26 percent who were " religious" and had a low 
death anxiety. The Pearson correlation between the DAS and one's degree 
of rel igion revealed a statistically significant correlation-the one who is 
religious has a higher death anxiety. 
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Table 11. Death Anxiety by Response to the Question 
"I Consider Myself to be a Religious Person"* 
(Percents in Parentheses) 











*Thirty-three percent of the cells had expected frequencies of less than 
5, thus a Chi-square test cannot be used, N = 65. 
Pearson's R = .22032 p = .0389 
Miners who were afraid of black lung disease (57 percent of all miners 
surveyed) also revealed a high death anxiety (see Table 12). Eighty-two per-
cent of miners stating they were afraid of black lung disease also had a 
high death anxiety. 
Table 12. Death Anxiety by Fear of Black Lung Disease 
(Percents in Parentheses) 








N=67 X2 =6.841 df=2 
Pearson's R = 0.28697 p = .0093 




As one might expect, the miner who thinks more often about an accident 
in the mines also tends to have a greater death anxiety. While this relation-
ship was not statistically signi ficant at the .05 level (see Table 13), the ma-
jority (65 percent) of those who thought of an accident-even a fatal 
one-daily or frequently had a high death anxiety. 
Table 13. Death Anxiety by Frequency of 
Thoughts of Mining Accidents (Percents in Parentheses) 
The thought of my having an accident in Death Anxiety 
the mines, even a fatal one, occurs High Low 
Daily/Frequently 11 (65) 6 (35) 
Occasionally 28 (80) 7 (20) 
Seldom/Never 7 (47) 8 (53) 
N=67 X2 = 5.587 df =2 p = .0612 
Likewise, the miner who thinks about his/her health more often has a 
higher death anxiety (see Table 14). Of those who think of their health 
"often" or " everyday" 78 percent have a high death anxiety. A statistically 
significant correlation (p = .0046) exists between DAS and frequency of 
thinking about one's health. The more one thinks of his/her own health, the 
greater their death anxiety. 
Table 14. Death Anxiety by Frequency of 
Thoughts of One's Health (Percents in Parentheses)* 











*Thirty-three percent of the cel ls have expected frequencies of less than 
5, thus a Chi-square test cannot be legitimately used. 
N=67 X2 =7.174 df=2 p=.028 
Pearson's R = .3162 p = .0046 
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Attitudinal Survey of Eastern Kentucky Coal Miners 
Please answer the following questions by putting the appropriate response 
in the space provided. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
1. Number of years worked in coal mines, __ _ 
2. Are you now 1. __ working 
2. __ ret ired 
3. _ _ not working 
3. I am 1. __ married 
2. __ single 
3. __ divorced/separated 
4. __ widowed 
4. Is your spouse currently employed outside the home? 
1. __ full time 
2. __ part time 
3. _ _ does not work 
5. List the ages of all persons who are financially dependent upon you for 
support. 
Daughters __ , __ , __ , 
Sons ,__, __ . 
Parents __ , __ , __ , __ , __ . 
In-Laws ,_ __ ,_ __ , 
Unrelated persons or relatives __ , __ , __ , 
On the following questions, please place a "T" next to the question if you 
feel it is true (if you agree with the statement). Place an "F" next to the 
question if you feel it is false. 
6. __ I am very much afraid to die. 
7. __ The thought of death seldom enters my mind. 
8. __ It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death. 
9. __ I dread to think about having to have an operation. 
10. __ I am not at all afraid to die. 
11. __ I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer. 
12. __ The thought of death never bothers me. 
13. __ I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly. 
14. __ I fear dying a painful death. 
15. __ The subject of life after death troubles me greatly. 
16. __ I am really scared of having a heart attack. 
17. __ I often think about how short life really is. 
18. __ I shudder when I hear people talking about a World War Ill. 
19. __ The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me. 
20. _ _ I feel that the future holds nothing for me to fear. 
Check the answer that is closest to how you really feel. 
21. I am not afraid of 
black lung disease. 
22. I consider myself to be 
a religious person. 
23. My religious beliefs 
help me deal with 
feelings toward death. 
24. How often do you 
attend church services? 
25. Within the past 5 years 
or so have you witnessed 
or been a part of a 
situation in which someone 
died or was seriously 
injured? 
26. If yes, how many times 
has this happened? 
27. Who is the most 
responsible for safety 
in the mines? Check 
only one. 
28. The thought of my 
having an accident in the 
mines, even a fatal one 
occurs. 
29. Most mining accidents are 
1. __ strongly disagree 
2. __ somewhat disagree 
3. __ neutral 
4. __ somewhat agree 
5. __ strongly agree 
1. __ strongly disagree 
2. __ somewhat disagree 
3. __ neutral 
4. __ somewhat agree 
5. __ strongly agree 
1. __ strongly disagree 
2. __ somewhat disagree 
3. __ neutral 
4. __ somewhat agree 
5. __ strongly agree 
1. __ never 
2. __ a few times a year 
3. __ about once a month 
4. __ every week 
5. __ every day 
1. __ yes 
2. __ no 
1. __ once 
2. __ twice 
3. __ three times 
4. __ more than three times 
1. __ myself 
2. __ other miners 
3. __ the safety committeeman 
4. __ the boss 
5. __ the company operator 
1. __ dai ly 
2. __ frequently but not every day 
3. __ occasionally 
4. __ seldom/rarely ever 
5. __ never 
1. __ caused by miner's errors 
2. __ caused by lack of mine 
safety features 
3. __ inevitable in mining 
13 
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30. Within the past year a 
close friend or relative 
has died. 
31. How do you rate your 
health at the present time? 
32. I think about my health. 
33. My health interferes 
with my ability to work. 
34. How often do you 
visit a doctor? 
35. __ Age 
36. Sex 1. __ male 
2. _ _ female 
37. Education 1. __ 0-8 years 
2. _ _ 9-11 years 
1. __ yes 
2. __ no 
1. __ excel lent 
2. __ good 
3. __ fair 
4. __ poor 
5. __ very poor 
1. __ every day 
2. __ often 
3. __ sometimes 
4. __ only occasionally 
5. __ never 
1. __ strongly disagree 
2. __ somewhat disagree 
3. __ neutral 
4. __ somewhat agree 
5. __ strongly agree 
1. __ every week 
2. __ at least twice a month 
3. __ every month 
4. __ every couple months 
5. __ a few times a year 
3. __ High School Diploma 
4. _ _ Vo-tech School 
5. _ _ Some College 
6. __ Col lege Graduate 
38. What is the title of your current (or if retired, last) job in the mines? 
Conclusions 
The history of coal mining reveals that forty or fifty years ago the acci-
dent and death rates were extremely high and mine safety laws were absent 
or unenforced. The advent of important mine safety legislation did not oc-
cur until 1946. At this point, it was widely agreed that the primary respon-
sibility for improving mine safety and reducing the accident rate had to rest 
with the mining companies rather than with the miners themselves. This 
emphasis on safety legislation and enforcement paid big dividends. The 
death rate in the coal industry has fallen from 1.7 per million hours worked 
in 1932 to 0.4 per million hours in 1976. 
An important question which must be addressed is whether continued 
emphasis on company side regulations and enforcement is likely to result 
in continued significant reductions in the rate of accidents. 
When miners were asked whether miners or the company are most 
responsible tor mining-related accidents, nearly three-fourths of those in-
terviewed claimed that they themselves or other miners were primarily to 
blame rather than the boss or the company. The basic problem identified by 
the younger miners was that of carelessness, while the older miners cited 
neglect of safety features and procedures. 
These results imply that the focus of further efforts to reduce the number 
of mining accidents should be on the miners themselves rather than on 
additional safety regulations on the company. Education and training 
programs on the dangers of carelessness and misuse of safety equipment 
would seem the most promising. Some examples would be: posting signs 
in the mines, education for foremen on the importance of enforcing safety 
regulations, and films on possible accidents due to carelessness. Hope-
fully, such measures will help to reduce the number of mine accidents. 
Some writers (Dumont and Foss, 1973; Charmaz, 1980) have suggested 
that many Americans are death denying. Such an assertion is probably ac-
curate with our use of death euphemisms, moving death away from the 
home to a hospital or nursing home, and calling on professionals to handle 
the body. An interesting, related question has been examined in this work: 
Are coal miners less death denying than others due to their more frequent 
exposure to death and near death experiences? 
A study by Fiefel (1967) of physicians' death anxiety compared to a con-
trol group found that physicians were more fearful of death than the non-
physicians. Occupations dealing with death on a daily basis make one more 
aware of his/her own mortality. Whereas physicians largely relate to the 
death of others, coal miners deal with the possibility of their own deaths. 
This study found that approximately two-thirds of the miners had high 
death anxiety. This finding appears to support the work of Garrity and Wyss 
(1976). In comparing death and bereavement practices in Eastern Kentucky 
and non-Appalachian Kentucky, they suggest that death denial , avoidance 
and invisibility are not the norms in Eastern Kentucky. Due to the relative 
isolation because of geographic barriers to transportation, a Gemeinschaft-
type society developed in Eastern Kentucky-a unique folk culture based 
on frontiersman, self-sufficiency, and individualism tempered by strong 
kinship and neighborhood ties. 
In summary, the miners interviewed felt they, rather than the mining com-
pany, are primarily to blame tor accidents. Education and training tor 
miners on the possible results of carelessness would seem useful. Since 
most miners interviewed experienced high death anxiety, efforts to reduce 
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Mine Safety: Rallying Cry or Creed? 
By Stuart Seely Sprague 
As long as coal is mined, there will be fatalities. Only the annual magni-
tude will change. The buzzword after a major mine disaster is "mine 
safety." like motherhood, is an emotional, positive, somewhat nebulous 
bundle of values that is rarely concretely defined. Does mine safety mean 
that each miner will be careful? Or does it relate to training, equipment de-
sign, and elimination of hazardous conditions? 
The former belief leads to the mining equivalent of " the nut behind the 
wheel being the most dangerous part of the automobile." The latter series 
assesses blame upon coal companies, equipment manufacturers, and law-
makers. Normally such assessments are made in the emotionally charged, 
finger-point ing days following a disaster-hardly the optimum environment 
for clear thinking. Nowhere is the complexity of the problem better argued 
than in the Kentucky Coal Journal's "In the Wake of Disaster," which 
appeared in May 1976 after the Scotia mine disaster, which reads in part:1 
Before we hasten to convict the Scotia Coal Company, let us 
consider that it is not alone on trial in the Scotia disaster. Many 
others are on trial: the coal industry, the federal and state agen-
cies responsible for mine safety, the Scotia employees, the news 
media, the public, Congress, and the Kentucky legislature. 
All can be blamed in some degree for the loss of 26 lives in ex-
plosions March 9 and 11 at Oven Fork in Letcher County. 
The bill of particulars for indictment could read as follows: 
... the coal industry for not policing its members more effec-
tively 
... the federal and state agencies whose safety standards and 
enforcement obviously are not adequate in the interest of safety; 
. . . the mine employees, for tolerat ing unsafe conditions in the 
mine and unsafe practices among fellow workers; 
.. . the news media, for coming awake to mine hazards on ly after 
disaster strikes, instead of pressing relentlessly for reforms; 
... the public, whose callous indifference to mine tragedies (ex-
cept in their own communities) is surpassed only by their indif-
ference to slaughter on the highways; 
... the Congress, for failure to monitor sufficiently the enforce-
ment of those safety laws it enacts; and 
... the legislatures of Kentucky whose neglect of the Common-
wealth 's No. 1 industry, through failure to appropriate adequate 
funds for its safety, is jeopardizing the industry's well -being and 
future development. 
All of them, if they examine their conscience, wou ld have to 
admit to a measure of guilt for the Oven Fork dead. 
In addition to all this, there is the issue of fatalism-mining as Russian 
roulette, albeit with more chambers or, as put by 48-year-old Joe Sturgill, 
" You're going to die, period. If you die, you die. So what?"2 This is a relative 
of the company line that coal mining is a dangerous business, a line that 
has been heard in a thousand permutations over the years. 
Action on mine safety correlates well with major mine disasters. The 
December 1907 Monongah, West Virginia explosion that killed 361 men, 
coupled with later, lesser explosions in the years immediately following, 
led to the formation-in 1910-of the Bureau of Mines in the Department of 
the Interior. Within a decade, the carnage caused by spectacular explo-
sions diminished markedly (though, when 1920 is compared with 1907, the 
number of fatalities in three categories-falls of roof and coal, haulage, and 
electricity-had each increased.3 
In the 1920's, the doctrine of individual responsibility for accidents was 
preeminent. The 1923 Coal Commission's three volume, two thousand page 
reports devoted 133 pages to " mine health and safety" but much of that 
regarded earlier workmen's compensation laws rather than accident analy-
sis. Indeed, though roof falls were the leading accident cause, such events 
were not detailed until 1925.4 State laws tended to be weak and honored in 
the breach; federal laws met pretty much the same fate.5 
Due to the availability of statistical series for 1930-1970 for both fatal and 
non-fatal (but disabling) injuries per million man hours, one can chart rates 
over time and compare them with conventional wisdom. Two caveats-an 
audit of non-fatal injuries at 105 mines showed that for the mid-1970's 
perhaps 60% of such accidents went unreported;6 and a drop in fatalities or 
injuries may be related to factors other than mine safety. Under-reportage is 
a problem for comparative purposes only if the rate of non-reporting 
changes. On the other hand, because it is far more difficult to conceal a 
fatality, more faith can be placed in those figures. (See figure 1). 
The fatality rate per million hours worked decreased from 1.9 in 1930 to 
1.3 in 1933. Possibly this reflects shorter work week (reducing fatigue), less 
pressure for productivity (th·e market was very dull), and the bankruptcy of 
marginal mines (often associated with higher accident rates). But from 
1934 to 1943, the rate remained with in a narrow band of 1.4 to 1.6, despite 
moving from depression to war economy and the re-entry of older miners 
into the work force.7 In 1944 the rate dropped to 1.2, the lowest on record. 
Yet, except for 1968, the 1944 figure matched the highest from then to the 
end of the statistical series, 1970. 
Such figures contradict the view that-when the UMWA signed the 1946 
agreement whereby the UMWA would be paid per ton royalties-the union 
turned its back on mine safety. Such charges were commonplace following 
the 1968 Farmington Disaster.8 Curiously, that year followed eight con-
secutive years during which the fatal ity rate did not increase. (See figure 2.) 
The statistics for non-fatal injuries (Figure 2) are striking-the rate 
declines dramatically from 1938 to 1959. Even making allowances for a 
change in the degree of under-reportage, the directional thrust is so strong 
as to defy any other interpretation. The figures deviate from the anticipated 
outcome the royalty agreement. Technological advances-including the 
roof bolt and better mining machinery-played a role. The decline of the 
piece rate (being paid on a per ton basis) ameliorated the safety/income 
dilemma, since safety work had previously been seen as financially un-
productive for the miner.9 
Concern about mine safety correlates well with major death-dealing ex-
plosions. Indeed, the modern era of mine safety was introduced by the 
November 20, 1968, Farmington Disaster. The event was so powerful that it 
also helped launch the Black Lung movement and a successful bid to over-
throw Tony Boyle. What stunned the nation into act ion was not the UMWA 
president's declarat ion that " as long as we mine coal , there is always this 
inherent danger," but his unbelievably insensitive state ment-albeit one 
that ironically may well have been true-that Consolidation, the company 
at whose mine 78 men had just died, was "one of the best companies to 
work with as far as cooperation and safety are concerned." Soon Ralph 
Nader wrote a st inging letter declaring that " the record is overwhelming 
that Mr. Tony Boyle has neglected his responsibility to protect coal 
miners."10 
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Before the sordid drama was played out fully, Boyle's challenger's family 
would be murdered in their beds. But even before that, pressure built up for 
Black Lung and mine safety legislation. The result was the 1969 Coal Mine 
Health and Safety Act, the first significant safety legislation for the in-
dustry since 1952-1953. The mood was so pro-safety that even Tony Boyle 
made a health and safety speech at Welch, West Virginia in July 1969. More 
to the point are two statistics. The UMWA's Safety Department in 
Washington consisted of but a single man; in Northern West Virginia, be-
tween 1933 and 1954, only two of 500 arbitration decisions related to safety. 
Though the arbitration statistics are earlier, the miniscule fraction relating 
to safety seems to indicate a low UMWA priority for this matter.11 
Soon, public interest declined. Arnold Miller, an unabashedly reform 
UMWA president, wrote in 1973 that "recent evidence ... indicates that the 
public 's interest in the plight of the miners is declining."12 He cited the 
spotty media coverage given to recent disasters. 
The lack of sustained attention to mine safety can be mitigated by 
reviewing thousands of Kentucky coal related clippings from 1975 to date. 
The newspapers in question include three dailies-the Louisville Courier 
Journal, the Lexington Herald-Leader, and the Ashland Daily Independent. 
Some dozen or more Eastern Kentucky weeklies, including the important 
Whitesburg Mountain Eagle, were also monitored. Of the hundreds of coal 
articles per year, only a relative few concerned mine safety. Far more 
"newsworthy" were the vicious intra-UMWA bickerings and strikes, and the 
economic health of the cyclical coal industry. This is consistent with an 
analysis of UMWA articles in the 1917-77 Louisville Courier-Journal lndex. 13 
Articles for 1975 (relative to mine safety) fall into two convenient 
categories, state and national. In Kentucky, great concern was shown over 
the increased death rate in the western coalfield. Though MESA (the United 
States Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration) failed to discover 
statistical patterns-underground vs. surface, small operations vs. large 
ones, neophytes vs. experienced miners-people with axes to grind found 
their respective scapegoats. The UMWA blamed the " unsafe conditions at 
small, non-union operations. " Others declared that inexperienced 
youngsters were dying; still others claimed that experienced men were be-
ing switched from one job to another and thus-in terms of the task at 
hand-were inexperienced.14 
In Western Kentucky the mine death issue became entangled in the 
fierce infighting within the UMWA leadership. Houston Elmore, a former 
Eastern Kentucky UMWA organizer, blamed District #23's representative on 
the union's International Executive Board for inaction, declaring that "four-
teen miners have been killed in Western Kentucky and Patterson has not 
raised his voice against unsafe practices by the coal companies.15 
Patterson criticized UMWA reform president Arnold Miller, and for his 
heresy was summarily ordered to a tour of duty in Alaska, the UMWA's 
equivalent to Siberia. Patterson supporters claimed that Miller, not Patter-
son, was responsible for unsafe practices, citing the instance of a safety 
coordinator sent to the dist rict against the wishes of the district with the 
result that a widow lost extra benefits. 1s 
At the national level, interest centered on MESA specifically (1) the 
resignation of James M. Day as its head; and (2) the possible movement of 
the agency from Interior to Labor. The Lexington Herald called Day "one of 
the Nixon administration 's unwanted legacies," predicted that "the new 
head of MESA will have a lot to say about how safe the nation's mines are," 
and opined that "by appointing a dedicated mine-safety expert Mr. Ford 
could do a lot to end the pit's long tradition of death and disability.17 
MESA was created in 1973 to stifle criticism that having mine safety in 
the Bureau of Mines doomed it to failure as the primary emphasis of the 
Bureau was production, not protection. Now, three short years later, the 
same argument was used to move MESA from the Department of Interior to 
the Department of Labor. Representative John Dent, (D-Pa.), expressed a 
commonly held view when he declared, "We gave Interior a very meaningful 
health and safeth statute in 1969, and they've literally blown it with their en-
forcement and legal interpretations." 18 Yet, when it came to coal research, 
neither the National Coal Association nor the UMWA wanted to give that 
responsibility to MESA.19 In the eyes of the UMWA, as expressed by 
Secretary/Treasurer Harry Patrick, " what we really need . .. is to have good 
enforcement of the laws we already have. It doesn't do any good to have 
laws if they are not enforced." 20 
New MESA head Robert Barrett, in the course of confirmation hearings in 
1976, clair:ned that "There is no earthly reason why a man has to die in a 
mine." Barrett called 1975 a bad year for mine safety, relating it to the 
highest production total since 1947 and a workforce that increased by 
34,000 miners to 182,000.21 The year was also memorable for the Scotia 
Mine disaster at Oven Fork, Kentucky (actually two separate disasters) that 
rocked the nation. 
The feisty Whitesburg Mountain Eagle said of Scotia:22 
Like most mine accidents, this one appears-at this stage of the 
various investigations-to have been a classic case of routine de-
fiance of the law by a money-hungry company run by absentee 
owners with no concern for the men who made the profit s possi-
ble. They appear to have had a silent partner in MESA itself; in-
spectors routinely cited violations and the violations were just as 
routinely reduced by assessment officers in Washington. 
The Mountain Eagle anticipated little from the investigation, remember-
ing that:23 
It wasn't so long ago that Finley Coal Company's mines in Leslie 
County-deathtraps from the day they opened, as federal records 
clearly showed-blew up and killed 38 men. We all had a ringside 
seat at the circus that followed: a bungled investigation, a 
gutless prosecution, and the successful defense of the mine 's 
operators by Bert Combs, a former governor and former judge 
with no visible concern for the underdogs who once voted him in-
to office. Unfortunately, the judge is good at what he does, and 
it's clear as can be that there will be no justice-now or ever-for 
the victims of the Scotia tragedies unless the federal government 
decides to break with the past and commit its resources to 
enforcing the law. 
L. Thomas Galloway of the Center for Law and Social Policy declared that 
MESA's enforcement policy had become "a shambles in six short years due 
to being 'poorly administered' and having penalties that are 'far 
too low.24 Powerful Eastern Kentucky congressman the late Carl D. Perkins, 
led the charge for moving MESA from Interior to Labor.25 Scotia had, since 
1970, been cited for 855 violations, yet MESA failed to shut it down. 
Debate-as to whether enforcement was growing stiffer or more lax, and 
whether moving MESA from Interior to Labor would improve things-con-
tinued well into the fall.26 
Kentucky's Governor Julian M. Carroll , by Executive Order 76-288, 
established the Deep Mine Safety Commission, March 29, 1976. The fifteen 
member commission-four representing the General Assembly; three each 
from the UMWA, Mining Industry Management, and the Kentucky Depart-
ment of Mines and Minerals; one each from MESA and the Univer-
sities-was to report and disband by October 15, 1976.27 
Staff developed a one page "Focus for Commission," agenda, and a work 
program for the commission (including notes for agenda items). In this 
manner, staff facilitated the accomplishment of the objectives. Due to its 
shortness and significance in defining areas of interest, the "Focus for 
Commission" is printed in full:28 
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Focus For Commission 
Department of Mines and Minerals 
1. Role and function 
2. Authority 
3. Relationship to MESA 
4. Adequacy to staff 
5. Effectiveness of department 
Supervisor Certification and Miner Training 




Adequacy of Regulations and Enforcement Process 
1. Objective statements of mine safety requirements 
2. Clear assignments of responsibi lity 
3. Authority to fulf ill responsibi lity 




The more detailed pages asked specific questions, sometimes 
searching, for example: 
• When overlapping authority and responsibility exist [between 
MESA and Kentucky's Department of Mines and Minerals], is 
there adequate coordination? 
• Where are the soft spots in authority? What gaps exist in the 
mine safety responsibilities of the two agencies? 
• How effective have the programs of the Department of Mines 
and Minerals and MESA been in the past? What objective data is 
available to substantiate this assessment? 
• How valid are the training programs at all levels? 
• Should all miners and supervisors be required to satisfactorily 
complete a safety refresher course each year? On whose time? 
As a condition for continued employment? 
• Where there is evidence that a miner's carelessness con-
tributed to an accident. . . should the miner be subject to penalty 
in the same manner as the company? 
• Are current regulations (Federal and State) sufficiently com-
prehensive and comprehendible to provide a safe working en-
vironment? 
• If a full-time safety inspectors program was implemented, 
what current safety functions or efforts would be eliminated? 
• How many inspectors are needed? Should there be a relation-
ship between the number of miners employed in a mine and the 
number of inspectors? 
Obviously, much work had already been done before the first meeting. A 
task force approach was urged as was the concept of using a variety of 
meeting formats ranging from site inspections to expert witnesses to 
public hearings. 
The commission set up three task forces at their initial meeting: 
Regulatory Agencies and Procedures, chaired by Senator Gene Huff; Mine 
Training and Certification, headed by University of Kentucky Professor of 
Mining and Engineering Ted D. Haley and a Resident Mine Safety Inspector 
task force chaired by Representative Glenn R. Freeman. The meeting did 
not end until 3 p.m., as there was considerable discussion as to how the 
commission should proceed and what data needed to be collected. A se-
cond meeting was set for June 1, 1976.29 
Press coverage of the June 1 meeting centered upon the split over the 
resident inspector issue. Glenn Freeman, (D-Cumberland), who initiated 
such a bill in the 1976 legislature (one that was killed in the closing days of 
the session) and Cloyd McDowell, President of the National Independent 
Coal Operators Association and Vice-Chairperson of the subcommittee, 
took opposite sides of the issue. Joining Freeman was Bobby Dukes of the 
UMWA; S. Johnson, an Executive Assistant to H.N. Kirkpatrick, took the 
side of Cloyd McDowell. Predictably-on the issue as to who should pay for 
the inspectors-the UMWA felt that was the mine management respon-
sibility, while Cloyd McDowell , representing the independent coal 
operators believed that the cost should be borne by the miners.30 
As is often the case, what made the papers was the controversial clashes 
of opinion. What failed to reach public notice were many items that could 
have given the public an understanding of what mine safety was all about 
and how it was handled. For example, there was MESA's accident preven-
tion program, where those mines employing more than 150 (more than 200 
prior to April 1975) with accident rates greater than the national average 
became part of the program. After three months, if the mine's safety record 
improved to the point where the accident rate was below the national 
average, MESA personnel would be pulled out. 
When asked whether MESA's Accident Prevention Program 
demonstrates the validity of the resident inspection concept, John 
Crawford, Assistant Admin istrator of MESA, replied: 
Not necessarily. The MESA accident prevention personnel re-
main at the mine only long enough to reduce the accident rate to 
the national norm. A full-time inspector on site may have the ef-
fect of shifting safety responsibilities from the individual miner 
and the mine management to the inspector. There is ample 
evidence to demonstrate that this phenomenon could occur, and, 
if so, the whole purpose of the effort is defeated. We want to 
change behavior to make mine safety an automatic concern and 
priority-not something that happens simply because an inspec-
tor just might be around. 
MESA's John Crawford fielded numerous other questions. Included in 
them were the following exchanges: 
Q To what do you attribute the high accident frequency rate 
in one mine over the other? 
A Poor training. This is the real value of the Accident Pre-
vention Program. You work one-on-one with the miner. If a 
law violation is observed, it is cited: however, you also 
take time to point out the real significance of the violation 
and explain how the miner can overcome the unlawful and 
potentially dangerous work habit. 
Q Do most accidents occur because of pre-existing (fixed) 
conditions or due to " transit" or "instant" violations of 
the law? 
A The Madisonville Office (MESA) completed a recent 
analysis that demonstrated that a minimum of 60 percent 
of mine accidents were attributable to careless work 
habits. A recent Department of Mines and Minerals' 
report confirmed this finding. 
Q Can a high fatality rate be pinpointed to any certain time 
frame? 
A Yes, the greatest number of fatalities occur during a 
miner's first year of employment on a new job in the mine. 
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This again probably points to the lack of training as a ma-
jor contributing factor to mine accidents. 
[Comment: An "observation and contact" procedure is 
utilized in coal mines and is very similar to the MESA Ac-
cident Prevention Program. The primary goal is to change 
behavior (work habits). The miner is observed, deficien-
cies noted, and corrective Instruction provided. After a 
first violation warning, various levels of penalties are 
assessed.) 
Q Why does MESA inspection average 12 days in duration 
for two sections of a mine as compared to 12 hours for the 
Department of Mines and Minerals? 
A Because of inspection requirements. MESA inspectors, 
for example, must observe each function on each working 
section; must walk all escapeways; inspect all tracks and 
belts, etc. The state law doesn't necessarily specifically 
require many of these activities. 
Kentucky's Commissioner H.N. Kirkpatrick, Department of Mines and 
Minerals, in answer to a query, declared that the annual number of mine 
closures due to safety violations in Kentucky averaged between 130 and 
150. There followed other exchanges, for example: 
Q Does the Mine Foreman's Training Program include mine 
law? 
A Yes, one of the eight sections pertains to the mine law. 
[Comment: The Federal law is not adequately covered. 
Certainly, the foreman's exam doesn't adequately test an 
individual 's knowledge to interpret and enforce the law.) 
Q Who establishes the curriculum used in training? 
A The Department. Training programs are geared toward 
MESA's certification requirements. 
[Comment: The curriculum seriously lacks good general 
safety training. The Commission needs a comparison of 
the MESA and Department of Mines and Minerals' train-
ing curriculums.] 
Q Is an up-to-date record kept on all certified mine foremen? 
A No. The only record is when the exam is taken and the 
results. 
[General observation by numerous Commission 
members: The Federal law is far too complicated and 
legalistic for the average person to understand. The Com-
mission should do everything possible to expedite the 
development of a version of the Federal law, using 
layman's terms, so the average coal miner can know what 
the law requires of him and his employer, and why.) 
Bobby Dukes of the UMWA, after passing out cop ies of the National 
Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974 and going over with the Com-
mission, Article Ill, the health and safety section, answered questions such 
as: 
Q Is the Health and Safety Committee idea really working? 
A Not to its maximum potential. The primary shortcoming is 
that safety committeemen have regular full-t ime jobs. He 
has to perform that job; therefore, he is confined to one 
location or area. He is not free to move around the mine 
and observe all operations and conditions. 
Q How would a resident on-site safety inspector tie into the 
safety committee? 
A They would probably be one and the same. If a mine 
(because of size) rated only one inspector, he would pro-
bably be the miner who was chairman of the Health and 
Safety Committee. 
Q Do committeemen get special training? 
A Yes. They must have at least a quarterly update, but the 
training programs called for in the contract have never 
really gotten off the ground. There are a few formal pro-
grams around. The University of Kentucky, tor example, 
has a training program tor safety committeemen. 
A Peabody Coal Company Inter-Company Memorandum on Safety was in-
cluded with the minutes. The company's program objectives were: 
1. To help instill safety practices and proper operating 
methods. 
2. To promote productivity with efficiency and safety. 
3. To comply with the National Bituminous Coal Usage 
Agreement, 1974. 
4. To promote compliance with Federal and State Laws. 
According to the Peabody Coal Company's analysis, " the emphasis on 
safety has been greatly increased during the past few years and especially 
since the Health and Safety Act of 1969. The improvement of safety condi-
tions have been brought about by Safety Engineering, the Human Element; 
worker-job environment." Safety engineering led to better equip-
ment-safety helmets, safety toe shoes, safety glasses, color coded wires, 
but had a " drawback, in that workers took on a false sense of security, in-
tended to be more relaxed in other areas of safety." The human element 
centered on the individual and led to first aid and mine rescue programs. 
The worker, job, environment classification had to do with " occupational 
diseases, illnesses and recurring accidents."31 
The June 21-22 meetings at Madisonville in the Western Coal Field were 
preceded by a two hour tour of Peabody Coal Company's recently opened 
Sinclair #2 mine. That tour elicited as much newspaper comment as the 
meeting itself. Indeed the Courier-Journal's lead paragraph was:32 
MADISONVILLE, Ky.-Rep. Glenn Freeman said he is more con-
vinced than ever of the need for resident inspectors in 
Kentucky's coal mines after visiting a Peabody Coal Company 
underground operation yesterday. 
The Central City Times Argus did not take kindly to Freeman's slam and 
headlined their account "Auto dealer-legislator has low opinion of coal 
mine safety in Muhlenberg."33 The Lexington Herald's account devoted 
considerable space to the Peabody Coal Company's level of safety training 
as follows:34 
Both Gibson and Charles Head, a United Mine Workers execu-
tive and a commission member, complimented the safety train-
ing program at the Sinclair No. 2 mine, one of the 11 underground 
mines operated by Peabody Coal Co. in Western Kentucky. 
" The compay has gone beyond what is required by law or in the 
union contract," Head said. 
For example, Peabody requires that, In addition to annual safe-
ty courses, a man must take a job specific hazards course if he 
changes jobs inside a mine, the official noted ... 
Gibson also said that Peabody's method of holding most of its 




The fullest coverage of the meeting was in the Madisonville Messenger 
and one can perhaps get a flavor of the gathering from the following ex-
tracts:35 
A good crowd, strong testimony, and questioning that 
bordered on courtroom cross-examination were the main ingre-
dients during the four hours of the Kentucky Deep Mine Safety 
Commission's public hearing held Monday night in the 
auditorium of Madisonville Community College. 
With 13 of the commission 's 15 members present, including 
one proxy, the panel heard testimony from eight management of-
ficials and five others, including representatives of the United 
Mine Workers, a consulting engineer, and a mining student 
whose frank comments won him several job offers. 
The question most often put to those testifying was how best 
to continuously motivate the miner to think safety at all times. 
Training programs are the most effective, about half the speakers 
felt, with most others saying regular inspections are needed to 
keep principles learned in training in practice on the job . .. 
Each of the 125 or so attending the hearing registered in ad-
vance and the names of those who said they wished to address 
the commission were handed to Gibson, who called their names, 
alternating between management and non-management 
spokesmen as much as possible. 
Some spoke from prepared statements, but the most helpful in-
formation came during stiff questioning from the panel members. 
The UMW representatives had the opportunity to quiz the 
highest-ranking company officials, just as management was able 
to question union spokesmen. 
In general, management pointed to stepped-up training pro-
grams and reductions in mine accident frequency and severity 
rates. The union men said there was not enough safety training. 
The operators steered away from putting blame and respon-
sibility on the individual miner, but the consulting engineer and 
the mine student did not. 
Just as later public meetings in Eastern Kentucky would have a 
predominance of union people in the audience, at Madisonville it was mine 
management's men that filled the auditorium- the largest registered con-
tingent came from Peabody Coal ; the second largest represented Island 
Creek. 36 
Don Walker of MESA's Health and Safety Division declared that the agen-
cy analyzes over 20,000 accident forms per year. Among factors that were 
statistically insignificant were age and shift. With respect to supervisors, 
MESA found that: 
Supervisors have a high rate of injuries and fatalities; [they are] 
usually injured or killed doing something not usually part of their 
job [and they are] more apt to be fatally injured than slightly in-
jured. 
With regard to the chief variety of mine accidents, roof falls, 1975 MESA 
statistics indicated that-87% of the time-these falls occurred in 
crosscut or intersection locations. With regard to the injured, "miners with 
over fifteen years total experience are the largest group of roof fall 
fatalities" and that "short experience at the mine closely correlates with 
roof fall accidents." 
Don Walker, when given the open-ended question of "What suggestions 
would you give the commission?" replied: 
Training; motivat ion and certainly enforcement of the law; [in ad-
dition the] Commission should not overlook [the] engineering 
aspect of safety, i.e. equipment design. 
Joe Mosgrove of the Kentucky Coal Association analyzed the thirty-three 
fatalities in underground mines for 1975. Six men were under 25; 18 were 
over 45. Eleven had less than five years experience; ten more than twenty. 
The most significant factor in becoming an accident victim seemed to be a 
"short length of service on job task." One-third were performing tasks other 
than their named duties at the time of the fatality. Shortcuts and " unsafe 
work habits" were commonplace. 
James R. Hawkins of the UMWA was asked "what are the most frequent 
complaints you confront during inspections?" He replied, " performance of 
others; concern about work habits of fellow miners." George E. Plemmons, 
also of the UMWA, c laimed that " training is an assist in safety but not the 
total answer" ; Plemmons felt that safety men must have close contact with 
the workers. 
Numerous coal company spokesmen stressed training. The following 
represents a sampling:J7 
• Jerry Omer, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Company 
Views quality training as the primary safety measure; P&M 
have a full-time professional educator (with mining) experience 
in charge of training. 
• Adolph Petzold, Island Creek Coal Company 
Safety training programs were a major factor in cutting 
fatalities over 50% ... severity of accidents reduced over 90%. 
• John Stachura, Amax Coal Company 
The greatest potential for mine safety is train ing and motiva-
tion; also [there is] much potential in better equipment design; 
however, training gives immediate return. 
A month later public hearings were held at Pikeville and Cumberland. In 
the interim Glenn Freeman announced that he would not seek re-election, 
believing that this would improve the chances of legislation requiring resi-
dent inspectors. 38 Considered a maverick, Freeman had been removed from 
the key House Appropriations and Revenues Committee. Likewise: 
" he was excluded from negotiations for a continuation of the 
1974 coal severance tax refund program-a program he was in-
strumental in guiding through the legislature ... "39 
Governor Julian M. Carroll suggested that Freeman had been playing 
politics with mine safety to improve his chances for re-election. The Harlan 
Daily Enterprise carried Freeman's side of the story, quoting the legislator 
as saying:40 
"The Governor might believe everybody is a creature of politics 
and politics is the only reason they do things. But he misjudged 
me if he thought that was the case here," Freeman said. 
Freeman became emotionally involved in the mine safety issue 
after the Scotia disaster. He knew most of the men killed in the 
explosions and their families. 
He says the issue is important enough to become emotionally 
involved with. 
"We're talking about lives. We're talking about the people you 
and I live with. It's important enough an issue that we involve 
ourselves in it," he said. 
While Freeman's decision to step out of politics can be im-
mediately tied to his pushing the resident inspector program, 
there are other factors which led to his action. 
"When the Governor accused me of playing politics with the 
mine safety bill , it was the straw that broke the camel's back," he 
said. " It's been really difficult for me anyway before this came 
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along. I haven't been really pleased with the relationship I've had 
with the administration . . . " 
Freeman said the Governor wants absolute loyalty from those 
around him to both him and his programs. "He wants it all the 
time, not part of the time, but all the time. I'm not saying he's 
wrong. If I were governor, I might demand the same thing. 
" But really, if you have blind loyalty, there's bound to be a lot of 
things you 're not going to do that you should be doing for the 
people. There has to be," he said. 
At Pikeville, Edward Moss, Training Director of the West Virginia Depart-
ment of Mines, testified that training materials had been inadequate-not 
merely out-of-date, but also costly, written in lar.guage that was incom-
prehensible, and often the material was not specific to coal mining. His ex-
perience was that the trainer's "educational background was most impor-
tant," more important than whether or not the man had mining experience. 
The West Virginia system would be suitable for Kentucky, requiring only 
" very minor modifications." 41 In West Virginia, by means of Senate Concur-
rent Resolution #12 , in 1973, a broad study of the West Virginia coal in-
dustry had been directed. But, 42 
"As the study progressed into the summer months, the commit-
tee was made aware of selected fatality and lost time accident 
statistics, [as a result] considerable alarm arose over the accident 
trend in young, inexperienced miners." 
At the Cumberland public meeting James Hackworth, a federal mine in-
spector whose brother died at Scotia, said:43 They (the State of Kentucky's 
inspectors) need 
to get out of the inspection business and hire people for educa-
tion and training. Why should you have the state when you have 
the federal inspectors doing the same thing? The coal operators 
will tell you the same thing. 
He added that the inspector concept was not a panacea: 
But I can't visualize the operators being against someone in the 
mines to spot imminent danger situations. Currently there is very 
little money being put back into mine safety. The men have a 
reluctance to tell federal inspectors of safety concerns for fear of 
getting fired. 
By late August, enough of the pieces of the safety puzzle had been put 
together for the Courier-Journal to express its views editorially. Portions 
follow: 44 
What has emerged, after months of diligent effort by men of 
widely varying points of view, is a workable program that can, at 
substantial but reasonable cost, make Kentucky the nation's 
leader in reducing the human toll that always has been part of the 
cost of mining coal. 
The heart of the program is based on state Representative 
Glenn Freeman's plan for resident mine inspectors. This was first 
offered in the waning moments of the legislature last March, after 
explosions had killed 26 men at the Scotia Mining company in 
Letcher County. Governor Carroll, despite emotional pressure to 
adopt some kind of a law immediately rejected that proposal in 
favor of a thorough study that would lead to legislation at a 
special session of the General Assembly this fall. . . 
If the task force's recommendations are accepted, a corps of 
highly qualified safety analysts will work in the mines with both 
miners and supervisors. They will study work habits and 
foremen's procedures to find potential accidents before they 
happen . .. 
The report recognizes that the federal Mining Enforcement 
Safety Administration (MESA) is the primary inspection and en-
forcement agency for coal mines (MESA normally has more than 
200 inspectors in Kentucky, nearly 10 times the size of the pre-
sent duplicative state inspection force.) 
The task force plan would make the state effort supplement, 
rather than duplicate, the federal inspection function. The plan 
would provide a valuable check on MESA's often criticized work, 
just as the MESA inspections would help assure the state pro-
gram's quality. 
Recommendations by the other two task forces, on the present 
mine laws and on training and certification, also offer major ad• 
vances. One of several valuable proposals was that a new miner 
must complete a 40-hour program of education and training, and 
an additional 90 days as a trainee under close supervision, before 
gaining a certificate of competency as a full-fledged miner. An· 
nual retraining, in a strengthened program, would be provided for 
all certified miners. 
A controversial feature of the plan among panel members is its 
proposed assignment of safety analysts according to the size of 
the work force. The range would vary from 120 hours a week of 
analyst time at a mine with more than 300 employes down to four 
hours at mines with fewer than 10 employes. 
A coal industry representative, Norman Yarborough, argued 
that assignments should be based on safety records, not on size. 
Yet a blunder by one or two miners in a mine with the finest of 
safety records can cause disaster, and the overall plan calls for 
special attention to mines with bad safety records. Represen-
tative Freeman's reply was more to the point: "they inspect the 
packing house every time they slaughter meat. .. What we want is 
a preventive program." Most of the argument centered on im· 
plementation of the plan. The major cost, $8.5 million a year to 
pay the safety analysts, isn 't trivial. But compared with the $90 
million a year that the coal severance tax is producing, in addition 
to corporate and other taxes paid by mines, it is modest. 
Mr. Yarborough also questioned, not unreasonably, whether 
enough qualified personnel can be hired to fill the analyst jobs. 
That's a bona fide question, because the program depends on the 
quality of the analysts. They would have to meet the qualifica-
tions of a mine inspector and, as the panel observed, ideally 
would have engineering degrees . . . 
Coal industry representatives, though critical of some pro· 
posals, played a constructive role, possibly because it was ap-
parent that no one was seeking punitive legislation. The main 
idea was to solve a problem through cooperation rather than 
coercion. 
The safety program has far to go before it becomes reality. It 
must be approved by the full commission and given final form by 
the General Assembly and the Governor. And funds must be 
found. But the need is urgent, as the 31 mine deaths in Kentucky 
during the first half of this year attest. The plan may never bear 
full fruit if it is allowed to dribble its way into operation. 
The Deep Mine Safety Commission on August 26 passed a resolution re-
questing " Congress to appropriate additional funds for the purpose of im-
proving the training of the Nation's coal miners."45 The commission also 
approved language regarding recommendations. Two concepts, both of 




The State shall institute a program of safety instruction for 
underground coal miners, designed to (1) train, test and certify all 
beginning miners; (2) retrain and recertify annually all miners, and 
(3) provide specific job related safety training to all miners 
assuming a new job or task 
and 
Concept 
The State shall initiate a mine safety program that places trained 
safety analysts in underground coal mines to observe and 
evaluate the work habits of all persons involved in coal produc-
tion and to contact, advise and assist these individuals in correct-
ing unsafe, careless or potentially hazardous actions. [With 
respect to training the Director would have both five years of 
underground mining experience and an educational background. 
The Department of Mines and Minerals would administer the 
training program] determining needs, planning programs, 
monitoring and evaluating training, testing and certifying ap-
plicants, etc. 
With respect to the safety analyst, the following were some of the prin-
ciples approved, though finalized recommendations were to be passed 
later. 
Principles 
1. The analyst shall be a State employee having qualifica-
tions equal to those of a State mine inspector. 
2. The analyst shall have all powers and authority granted 
a mine inspector under State law. 
3. The analyst will function primarily as an evaluator of 
work habits and a teacher or helper to the individual miner 
in developing safe work habits-and the inspector 
authority will always be available but, hopefully, very in-
frequently utilized or publicized ... 
Twice Cloyd McDowell added language strengthening recommenda-
tions. Fearing a shortage of inspectors he moved (Glenn Freeman second-
ed) that "the Commission shall give priority attention to high risk mines for 
program implementation." Likewise McDowell moved (William D. Blair 
seconded) that "The Commissioner shall report annually to the Governor 
and the General Assembly on the effectiveness of the Mine Safety Analyst 
Program." Under other recommendations two items were approved, namely 
that:46 
• Salaries of employees of the Department of Mines and 
Minerals should be competitive with the coal industry and 
the Federal Government. 
• The Department of Mines and Minerals will utilize the 
facilities of the Kentucky Energy Research Center for 
supportive laboratory services. 
David V. Hawpe, who had covered coal for the Courier-Journal since 
1969, interviewed a number of labor and mine owner spokesmen and con-
cluded that:47 
The operator's seeming attitude was best expressed by Rita 
Coal Company's Elmer Belcher. He is " quite concerned" about 
the new safety proposals but "fairly unclear" about the directions 
the proposals are taking. 
Belcher is sure of one thing: "You can't hold a miner's hand. I 
think it's great to train young miners. I'm for that. But you can on-
ly go so far. You can't hold a man's hand as he does his job. 
" We sure don't want anybody to get hurt in the coal mines," 
Belcher said ... "But safety programs only go so far. We haven't 
stopped people from getting killed on the highways, have we?" 
When asked why they have been so agreeable about the com-
mission's proposals, coal men emphasized in separate inter-
views that they are as dedicated as anybody to the safety of coal 
miners. 
David Zegeer, who manages Bethlehem Steel's extensive 
Eastern Kentucky mining properties, made that point, and added, 
"You can't afford not to operate safely." 
Interpretation: Lost-time accidents mean lost production. 
Labor spokesmen privately have said that a year in which 26 
men died at the Scotia mine is not a good year in which to oppose 
safety programs. Others have suggested that it would not be 
good politics for the coal industry to oppose safety programs to 
which the governor seems committed. Some point out that the 
coal operators are not going to be required to foot the bill. 
In late September, Governor Julian M. Carroll addressed the UMWA Con-
vention in Cincinnati, mentioning the disasters in the Scotia Mine and tell-
ing the crowd:48 
"I want you to know the office of governor is a very lonely spot 
when a tragedy of this nature occurs. You can 't help asking your-
self time and time again-what could I have done-was there 
some action I could have taken that might have prevented such 
an occurrence." 
The Governor spoke of the victims of roof falls and electrocutions, those 
who die singly, without media attention. He declared: 
" I am not willing to accept the premise that even one miner 
should die. Yes, Kentucky is No. 1 in coal production, but as I 
have said before-I do not want to sell coal that is stained by the 
blood of Kentucky miners. We must find the reasons behind 
these accidents and stop these needless deaths." 
Carroll placed his faith in safety analysts, not more rules, stating that:49 
A 1975 study on coal mine fatalities indicates that as many as 
two-thirds of the deaths were caused by miners taking shortcuts 
or having careless work habits .. . 
This program would "zero in on this problem .. . (for) the idea is not to 
catch a person doing something wrong and assess a penalty or fine, but 
rather to reduce the number of accidents." In addition, according to Ken-
tucky's governor: 
The mine safety analysts would be in a key position to help 
identify training needs of miners. 
"He will also be in a prime spot to evaluate the effectiveness of 
training efforts, since the real test of any educational venture 
must center on behavior change," he said. 
Carroll said he is convinced effective training can make a 
"significant impact" on reducing mine fatalities and accidents. 
The governor said testimony presented before the commission 
indicates training programs are generally poorly organized and 
administered. 
While the Governor was in Cincinnati, the chairperson of the Deep Mine 
Safety Commission was one of those gathered at Lexington's MESA Train-
ing Center where Senator Walter (Dee) Huddleston arranged a meeting of 
state and federal officials with coal industry leaders. At issue was the an-
nual cost of certifying underground miners, an idea whose time seemed to 
have come. The extra cost to the state was estimated at about $575,000.50 
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The seventh meeting of the Deep Mining Safety Commission began 
tamely enough with the unanimous approval of the minutes of the past two 
meetings. But then Paul E. Patton, representing the small operators, of-
fered a motion (seconded by Cloyd McDowell) that "No organization shall 
be represented by more than one member" on the board to certify miners. 
In Patton's view, "the larger coal companies may be more influential and 
could dominate appointments to the Board and thereby greatly influence 
decisions of the Board." Patton argued that big companies might "accept 
programs too costly or unmanageable for small firms." The three UMWA 
representatives saw the motion as a power play on the part of the operators 
to reduce the UMWA's representation to one. According to Charles Head of 
the UMWA, the mine owners would 
"have two operators (on the board) who would work together. 
Then they'd get their non-union miner appointed, and he'd do like 
they told him. And then where would we be?"51 
If the proceedings of October 4th were disconcerting to some commis-
sioners, they were nothing compared to the body blows suffered by Com-
missioner Glenn Freeman (D-Cumberland) the following day. The Courier-
Journal's lead read:s2 
FRANKFORT, Ky.-State Rep. Glenn Freeman, D-Cumberland, 
yesterday apparently lost his emotional six-month crusade to 
have resident safety analysts placed in Kentucky's underground 
coal mines. 
Freeman charged later that Governor Julian Carroll had 
engineered his defeat. 
Carroll told a Courier-Journal reporter in Ashland that Freeman 
was " totally off base." 
Freeman was the news and the article reflected it. Among the points 
made were that: 
Freeman began his campaign in March after 26 men died in ex-
plosions in Eastern Kentucky's Scotia mine near his district. Car-
roll then created the commission to make mine-safety proposals 
to a special session of the General Assembly, which will meet 
later this year. 
Freeman said he did not know if he will continue pushing his 
plan. 
Supporters of the commission's decision said the measure will 
help the state concentrate its limited resources on mines with 
safety problems. They also said that Freeman's plan probably 
was too expensive to be accepted by the legislature. 
Freeman bitterly disagreed, however, saying that the commis-
sion had "cut the heart" out of his proposal to prevent accidents. 
He said the panel's program reacts to accidents and problems. 
Freeman later angrily stalked out of the meeting. 
Freeman then told reporters that he suspected Carroll was 
responsible for the commission's action, but he said he had no 
proof. 
" I have always felt like he's behind this whole place," Freeman 
said in a Capitol hallway. " I'm not that naive." 
" My feeling all along has been that somewhere along the line 
this thing was going to get the ax, and I guess this was the 
place," he added. 
Carroll and Freeman in recent months have exchanged 
charges of " playing politics" over the analyst program. 
Carroll, denying having swayed the commission, said there are 
not now enough qualified prospective analysts to staff 
Freeman's project. 
"At such time that more analysts are available for hiring, we'll 
find the money to hire them," Carroll said. 
Other commission members said they hadn't heard from the 
governor. 
"The fact is that Freeman had an il l-conceived program," said 
Pike County coal operator Paul Patton, a commission member. 
"We've come up with what we think is the most efficient use of 
the state's resources to promote mine safety, which is what the 
governor asked us to do," Patton said. 
The bitterness of Freeman was understandable. On March 16 (with the 
blessing of Julian M. Carroll) his amendment favoring a "safety inspector 
plan .. . and increased ventilation at the working face" passed 86-1. But on 
the 20th, the amendment was dropped. The Mountain Eagle headlined its 
account: REPRESENTATIVE WEEPS AS BILL FOR STRICTER MINE SAFE-
TY FAILS. 
According to this account:53 
The turnaround was largely the result of Carroll's withdrawing 
his support. The governor explained his sudden change of mind 
by saying that the amendments needed more research, that the 
qualifications and responsibilities of the proposed safety men 
had not been adequately defined. 
Carroll maintained that he fully supported Freeman's idea of 
full-time employees whose only job would be ensuring the safety 
of their workmates. He promised to appoint a committee to study 
safety legislation and to make safety proposals at a special 
session scheduled later on this year. 
Freeman, who said he had drawn up his amendments after long 
hours of talk with Cumberland area miners after the Scotia 
disaster, wept on the House floor when his plan was killed by a 45 
to 24 vote. 
Coal operators started a storm of critic ism against Freeman's 
amendments. Cloyd McDowell, head of the Harlan Coal Opera-
tors Association, said the legislation would slow production and 
disrupt the mines. "This would cause a disruption in safety in-
spections at the mines. We already have two levels of inspection 
in state and federal." McDowell said. 
It was estimated that the in-mine safety inspectors, to be 
chosen by miners, unions, or the state Department of Mines and 
Minerals would cost $4.9 million a year to hire. 
Having twice failed, Freeman blamed the Carroll administration stating 
that "ultimately nothing can be done without the governor's approval. 
There's nothing he can't tap. There's nothing he can't influence." The con-
flict between Freeman and Charles Head, regarded as the UMWA's chief 
state lobbyist, was read by some as a move by the Union's secretary/trea-
surer to make a bid for UMWA President in 1977.54 The word which best 
described UMWA politics-since John L. Lewis-may be the word 
" chaotic." 
Safety played but a minor role in the 1977 UMWA presidential race. The 
view of an unidentified Eastern Kentucky miner may have been typical. He 
declared:55 
" I think the most important issues in the new contract (the item 
on which the election might hinge) will be a raise in pay. Better 
health care, a dental plan, eye care is important too. It's real hard 
for me to decide who to vote for. I read the UMWA Journal and I 
can 't figure out who's telling the lies." 
It was left to dark horse candidate Billie Duty, President of West Virginia 
local #633, to develop the safety issue. In the Mountain State there had 
been wildcat strikes, which duty claimed:56 
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Resulted from the grievance procedures. More often than not 
an umpire's decisions favor the company. Words don't mean a 
thing. A company lawyer takes the contract and twists it around. 
As might have been anticipated when the UMWA learned that both Scotia 
and the Blue Diamond Coal Company of Knoxville had been ineligible for 
federal supply contracts as a result of unsafe working conditions (an under-
secretary of labor wrote up a complaint charging sixty-nine violations of the 
Federal Mine Safety Act) they spread the word widely.57 Such a disclosure 
cost the UMWA nothing; yet made the union appear to be deeply concerned 
about mine safety. 
On March 6, 1977, the anniversary of the first of the Scotia explosions, a 
reporter for the Mountain Eagle interviewed a brother of one of the men 
who died that day. The article, reprinted in part in Question and Answer for-
mat explains in part the attitude towards death in the mines:58 
Q Why would anyone want to work in a gassy mine? 
A For the money. I made about $62 a day there, the best 
money I ever made in my life. 
Q Are you bitter about what happened? 
A No, not really. It was the workers' fault as much as it was 
the mines. They shouldn 't have been working in the gas, 
and the mine should have pulled them out when gas was 
detected. 
Q What about the second explosion on March 11, 1976? Do 
you think it could have been prevented? 
A Yes, by that time, all the curtains had been blown down, 
allowing the methane to build up again. Those men 
should have known better. The place should have been 
ventilated before they went in. 
At the federal level, Jimmy Carter supported the idea of moving MESA 
from Interior to Labor.59 MESA made the news again in June as under the 
Freedom of Information Act, the ratings of 23 Eastern Kentucky mines were 
made public. An ingenious " mine profile system" had been developed to 
pinpoint "problem mines" -a variant of the exception method of manage-
ment. The National Average rating was 700, Eastern Kentucky's ranged 
from a high of 965 for a mine of the Leslie Coal Mining Company to 423 for 
one owned by the Peter Care Coal Company. MESA officials noted that: 
• The real test of the ratings would come in twelve months, 
when mines would be re-evaluated. (For then) ad-
justments the mines make in response to their initial 
ratings would show up. 
• (That) while Eastern Kentucky had a better rating than any 
other district for holding down disabling injuries, it got 
the lowest score for compliance with federal health and 
safety regulations. 
From the standpoint of newspaper coverage and mine safety, 1978 was 
an extremely quiet year. No doubt the fact that the number of fatalities was 
halved (from 36 to 18) within Kentucky and that two mine inspection 
districts (West Kentucky and Hazard) were fatality free had something to do 
with the calm, as did a 110 day coal strike. Two editorials indicate just how 
differently two Kentucky papers viewed the situation. The Lexington Herald 
claimed that the:62 
COAL INDUSTRY (IS) A MAJOR ROADBLOCK IN AN EFFECTIVE U.S. 
ENERGY POLICY. Among the major points made by the Bluegrass Daily 
were: 
(Congress's) energy package contains important incentives for 
industries to switch from oil and natural gas to coal, this 
country's most abundant energy resource. But these incentives 
cannot completely override the fears generated in the business 
community by the coal strike about the vulnerability of an in-
dustry that converts to coal. .. besides the labor problem 
associated with the mining of coal, there are environmental and 
transportation problems that accompany its use. 
The Lexington paper made no mention of mine safety at all. Compare that 
to the Mountain Eagle 's MINERS ARE HUMAN:63 
It was mid-day two years ago that the first of two explosions hit 
Scotia Coal Co. at Oven Fork. When it was all over, 26 men were 
dead. Now, two years later, a distraught miner stops by the Eagle 
office, and tells us that "they're up to the same old tricks, playing 
with men's lives" and that a lot more men are going to be killed 
over there. 
Coincidentally, a mine safety official stops in to tell us we 
ought to know things are back where they started at Scotia. 
" They keep it up, there's going to be another explosion at 
Scotia. It could kill a hundred or more if it comes when there's a 
full shift on." 
"I tell you, Tom. There ain't no use in your writing anything. The 
state won't do anything. MESA won 't do anything. Even if they 
tried, the courts wouldn't let them. That's one thing we've learn-
ed. Hell , they won't even let the widows sue for the murder of 
their husbands. Why the courts won't even let MESA tell what 
happened." 
The Scotia disaster anniversary comes as miners throughout 
the Appalachian area await a federal court order at the end of the 
week under provisions of the much-hated Taft-Hartley labor law, 
ordering miners to mine coal or go to jail on contempt-of-court-
charges. 
President Carter, with an insensitivity to the problems of the 
coal miner that is astonishing, assumes a role as the nation's No. 
1 strike breaker. 
You really have to wonder where Mr. Carter has been these 
past few years. We've been told, over and over, that the nation 
faces an energy crisis of unprecedented proportions, a crisis of 
wartime proportions. We also are told that Mr. Carter and his 
federal experts view coal as the nation's best answer to that 
energy crisis. 
Now let's see. If the president is supposed to be concerned 
about the nation's problems and energy is the No. 1 problem and 
coal is the answer, you ought to be able to assume that the Presi-
dent has made some effort to find out something about the coal 
industry. Right? 
We fail to understand, however, the kind of White House action 
that treats coal miners as some kind of simple-minded idiots who 
have to be threatened at gunpoint by state police, U.S. marshals, 
sheriffs and their deputies, the National Guard, the U.S. Army, 
and numerous private armies on private coal company payrolls. 
Cut off the food stamps, starve the children, bring out the Guard, 
use live bullets, mine the coal! 
All this from a President who has brought world attention upon 
himself by talking about Human Rights. Coal miners are not 
human? 
As has been pointed out by many miners, whenever anybody 
has bothered to ask, the strike is not and never has been over 
wages. Mine safety is much more the issue. Every miner knows 
he might be killed tomorrow. He knows that state and federal 
mine safety laws are all too often ignored, that just about every 
coal operator will risk all for an extra margin of production, a little 
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more profit. The coal miner knows that when all is said and done 
he has only himself and his fellow workers to look to for safety, 
and that his most powerful weapon is his right to walk away from 
his job over safety issues. 
Far from being the wild, irresponsible child that many, in-
cluding the President, want to portray him, today's miner is much 
more likely to be a young, sincere, sensitive person who wants to 
do a responsible job and who insists it is not the miner, but the 
operator, who must shape up. 
Mr. Carter's naive swallowing of the coal operator line laid 
down by the Bituminous Coal Operators Association is, to put it 
mildly, shocking. And you have to wonder, is he handling other 
issues affecting the nation as badly? 
This might be as good a time as any; to point out that, while at 
one time we thought transferring mine safety enforcement from 
the Department of the Interior to the Department of Labor was a 
good idea, we can recall no sorrier performance by a cabinet 
member than that of Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall in the coal 
strike emergency. May God protect the coal miner's safety in the 
future as Mr. Marshall obviously is not up to the job. 
Mine safety, care for aged or disabled pensioners, medical 
care, dignity and, yes, human rights, these are what the strike is 
all about. President Carter and his man Marshall insult the miners 
when they talk about high wage offers, then criticize the miners 
for turning down the contract containing those " high" wages. 
Miners feel they are being held up nationally for contempt and 
ridicule by the President, who should know better. 
It must be remembered that, under the rejected contract, 
miners working for UMW mines still would be earning less than 
miners working for such non-union companies as South East 
Coal Co., and, yes, Scotia Coal Co. And their health plans would 
not be as good as those at non-union mines. Even so, we repeat, 
money has not been the issue. Instead, miners are insisting upon 
something that could be summed up in that phrase " Human 
Rights," at least as we understand the term. As miner Steve 
Brewer put it, "I'm no second class citizen and I'm not going to be 
treated Ii ke one." 
We can only hope that Mr. Carter will decide to be President of, 
by, and for all the people, not just the President of the utilities 
companies and the coal conglomerates. He is about to plunge 
the Appalachian coal fields into something approaching civil war. 
May God protect us all. 
The impact of mine-safety and schooling was clearly delineated in a 
newspaper interview with the head of Pikeville College's Department of 
Mining and Technology, James P. Ramsey. Portions of the interview in a 
Question and Answer format are reproduced below:64 
Q How much does it cost a student for a year full-time? 
A $195 for tuition. 
Q Why is mining so much less than tuition for other pro-
grams at Pikeville College? 
A The Federal Health and Safety Act of 1969 was an effort 
by Congress to protect underground coal miners. They 
also made funds available for health and safety education 
through a state's grants program with Commissioner 
Kirkpatrick, program director, Kentucky Department of 
Mines and Minerals. So, we receive a strong contribution 
from federal and state funds to offset the high cost. This 
is an effort to place young men and women in the coal in-
dustry with the proper attitudes and training toward 
health and safety. 
This may not have a tremendous impact in the short term, 
but I personally feel that for the long-term, (education and 
training), this is the only way to reduce accidents and 
fatalities in coal mining. 
Q Does a person without formal mining studies have as 
good an opportunity for jobs if the market does expand? 
A No! Coal mining has advanced so fast with sophisticated, 
highly technical, and complex machinery and equipment 
that the coal miner today that hopes to advance into a 
position of management must have formal training in min-
ing technology .. . 
Our objective is to train people for supervisory and 
management positions. We do not prepare a young per-
son to run a continuous miner or a cutting machine, but a 
lot of our graduates end up in the work force. 
What pleases me the most is to see 60 percent of our 
graduates in safety training departments of large coal 
mines: some are in engineering departments, several 
have been assigned specific tasks of handling penalties 
and assessments as a result of violations of the federal 
mine laws. 
Depending on the graduate's personality and desires, 
there is no restriction on what position they can qualify 
for. Several of our graduates are already managing coal 
operations; one has the position of superintendent of 
mines for a major coal company. 
a What about jobs in mining-related fields? 
A In 1974 I would have answered this question by saying 
yes, there are jobs in mine-related fields. Since the 1977 
Surface Mine Act and other related federal legislation, the 
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, these jobs are no 
longer mine related, but an intricate vital part of mining 
and permitting process itself. Even in the late 60's safety 
program people were at the bottom of the ladder in the 
mining industry. Now they are holding executive vice 
president positions right along with the vice presidents of 
production and engineering. These safety and en-
vironmental fields have become extremely important. In 
the future more of our graduates will be entering this 
facet of the mining industry. 
The comment that in 1974 "safety program people were at the bottom of 
the ladder in the mining industry" but now in just five years, all that has 
changed, is an indicator of the growing importance of safety. Mention of 
the 1977 Surface Mine Act and environmental concerns suggests the in-
creasing role of Surface Mining. Indeed, in 1979, the central theme was one 
of regulations and enforcement thereof, and not limited to deep mining. 
OSM (Office of Surface Mining) Director Walter N. Heine proclaimed that 
the agency "made a big difference" in coal mining practices and their im-
pact upon the environment in large part because states sought primacy. In 
order to become prime enforcers, the states must prove that "they can do it 
without OSM." In Kentucky's case "more operators' reclamation bonds 
were forfeited [in 1978] than in the previous nineteen years."65 
Paul Patton, former chairman of the National Independent Coal 
Operators Association, proclaimed at a coal conference that the combina-
tion of strip mine regulations and a coal glut will put Kentucky's small 
operations out of business within five years, as "under the new rules, in five 
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years, strip mining in steep-slope Appalachia will be insignificant." He call-
ed the small operators "the backbone of the industry," yet admitted that if 
oil interests took over, markets would stabilize as "they won't be induced to 
produce at an outrageous capacity."66 
A month and a half earlier the Senate had voted to relax strip mine regula-
tions. Wendell Ford (D-Ky.) used the type of rhetoric that later helped bring 
Ronald Reagan to the White House, declaring that "People are fed up and 
tired and sick of federal regulations. Here was a perfect example of con-
gressional intent being thwarted by an agency that used regulations to 
write new legislation." Mark D. Hatfield, (D-Ore.) remarked that " Coal may 
be America's energy ace in the hole, but OSM dealt us a joker instead."67 
Though the pendulum seemed to be swinging towards relaxing laws and 
their enforcement, such a move did not go unchallenged. MSHA was hit 
with a lawsuit charging lax enforcement of mine safety laws. There were 
only 1800 mine closures. Plaintiffs were the Council of the Southern Moun-
tains (CSM) and two UMWA locals. Three attorneys from the Washington-
based Center for Law and Social Policy represented the plaintiffs-L. 
Thomas Galloway, J . Davitt McAteer and Richard I. Weeb.68 
Nineteen eighty saw fewer mine-safety stories than any other year since 
1974. The closest thing to a safety story was a Lexington Herald editorial in 
the "too bad, sorry" tradition, written in the wake of three deaths in a 
Whitley County dog hole. After revealing that Knox and Whitley counties 
contained more illegal deep mines than legal ones, the editorial explained 
why such practices existed:69 
The reason men go to work in the unsafe wildcat mines is just 
as simple. Although their pay for work is often below the 
minimum wage, it is a job, in an area that is still economically 
depressed despite the predictions that a coal boom is just 
around the corner, that is enough . .. 
As long as there is coal to be mined cheaply and i llegally, the 
wildcat operations will continue. As long as there is no other 
work to be had, miners will continue to go into the wildcat mines. 
And as long as basic rules of safety are ignored in those mines, 
as they apparently were in the mine where Monday's deaths oc-
curred, miners will die. 
Mine safety statistics often fail to correlate well with what one might an-
ticipate from mine safety efforts. Carol Hymowitz wrote a thoughtful article 
in the Wall Street Journal attempting to make some sense out of disturbing 
statistics. She wrote that: 70 
Nearly everyone in the industry agrees that much of the pro-
gress in mine safety stems from the 1969 act, enacted after an ex-
plosion killed 78 workers at a Consolidation Coal Co. mine near 
Farmington, W.Va. For the first time, the act set standards for 
ventilating explosive mine gas and coal dust and preventing roof 
falls. 
Since then, the number of fatalities has dropped substantially, 
and the death-frequency rate, which measures fatalities in terms 
of hours worked, has fallen even more sharply. Last year, the rate 
stood at 0.30 death per million work hours, down from one death 
per million work hours in 1970. 
But a presidential commission study released last year said 
most of MSHA's safety gains were achieved in the early 1970's. 
Some "80 percent of the reduction in fatality incidence had been 
achieved by 1974," the report said, while "the incidence of disabl· 
ing injuries in mines has been increasing since 1975." 
One can construe the results many ways-everything from greater 
reportage of accidents (similar to the incidence of rape once the crime 
began to be taken seriously by the police) to the bel ief-by the 
mid-1970's-that the easy answers to death in the mines had been reached. 
There was also the belief, useful to Ronald Reagan that one must get 
government off the backs of business. According to Consolidation Coal , 
the 1979 Mine Safety Act and other regulations led to a 38% drop in produc-
tivity. Coal operators claimed that:71 
Many of MSHA's regulations are senseless and say many 
federal inspectors are more intent on issuing citations for 
violating safety regu lations than on preventing accidents. Many 
managers say that having fewer inspectors won't diminish 
safety-and might even improve conditions. 
"We're averaging 11 inspectors a day in our seven mines, and 
all a lot of them do is loaf around," says an executive at one Ohio 
company. Most of the citations issued by inspectors, he says, are 
for roof control , ventilation and electrical problems-" which are 
all serious matters; but a lot of inspectors will cite you for the 
silliest things in these areas, like one broken headlight on a 
machine, while never bothering to see if the brakes are working. " 
Other industry officials say some government safety regula-
tions actually create hazards. An example: the requirement that 
certain pieces of mine equipment be fitted with protective 
canopy covers. In low seam-mines that may be only two or three 
feet high, the canopies "resulted in reduced visibility and very 
cramped operating compartments," according to the Bituminous 
Coal Operators Association, which concluded that the canopies 
are " more hazardous than the dangers they were intended to pre-
vent." 
With the pro-deregulation sentiment emanating from the White House, 
there was a move to cut funding for MSHA. In the Senate, Orrin Hatch 
(R-Utah), proposed cutting the number of mine inspectors per deep mine 
from four to two; shortening hours of training for new miners from 40 to 16; 
limiting the number of fines given by MSHA inspectors; and eliminating 
items from the list of what constitutes a violation of mine safety. As could 
have been expected, the UMWA was infuriated. One of their safety 
representatives declared that, "We'll be going back to the days of mine 
disasters." UMWA President Samuel Church Jr. said that Reagan's cut-
backs " promise carnage in the nation's coal mines." Safety was important 
to the union not only per se, but also as a strong card in their organizing 
efforts. According to one UMWA official, "Being able to say we've got 
strong safety compliance at our mines is our drawing card."72 
••••••• 
The calendar year and the mine safety year do not coincide. Explosions 
occur most frequently during the late fall and winter. Thus the deaths of 
eight miners at Topmost in December were unexpected in terms of locality, 
but 'twas the season. That and a Tennessee disaster led to an editorial in 
the Courier-Journal. 73 
THAT CYCLE OF TRAGEDY IN THE MINES 
The unhappy irony of coal mining and other dangerous occupa-
tions is that safer times come, if ever, only after tragedy. Very 
often, a period of relative safety breeds complacency that sets 
the stage for a new calamity. And the cycle begins again: Such 
calamities over the years have prompted every major gain in mine 
safety. 
No one can say, before investigations are complete, that com-
placency was at the root of two explosions that killed eight 
miners in Kentucky and 13 in Tennessee this week. But mine ac-
cidents, like most other mishaps, often are caused by seemingly 
harmless shortcuts that don't seem all that risky at the time. 
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It's human nature to take the easy way, particularly when pro-
fits are involved. The difference between mining and most other 
pursuits is that the hazards of the former are innumerable and the 
risks greater. 
That's why vigorous enforcement of safety laws is necessary, 
and why it's particularly disconcerting that the Reagan ad-
ministrat ion's mine safety chief was talking only last week about 
weakening safety enforcement. The director, Ford B. Ford, said 
fines for violations may divert the operator's attention from 
abating safety hazards. He also talked of such money-saving 
ideas as fewer follow-up inspections to see if violations have 
been corrected. 
The number of federal inspectors already has been reduced 
and more cuts seem likely. It's doubtful that the legally required 
four inspections yearly for underground mines can be sustained. 
And Mr. Ford also contemplates reducing the minimal amount of 
safety training now required for miners. 
Present safety requirements in the mines are a product of the 
Coal Mine Safety Act of 1969, which was spurred to passage by 
the death of 78 miners in a Farmington, West Virginia accident 
the previous year. Nobody knows how many lives that law has 
saved. But the death rate in mining soon dropped to a third of the 
previous level. 
The price of coal in terms of human life always has been high. 
Mining will never be a safe occupation, at least until all under-
ground operations can be carried out by machinery. But a decade 
of relatively strict emphasis on safety has reduced the price. 
The grief of miners' families in Kentucky and Tennessee will 
hardly be lessened by realization that their tragedies are a warn-
ing. But if the warning is taken seriously, the deaths of yet 
another 21 miners won't have been entirely in vain. 
In January at Craynor, an additional seven lives were snuffed out. 
Although both mines (on paper, according to federal records) were safe, 
union inspectors soon after the accidents found "flagrant violations" of 
mine-safety laws. Willard Stanley, Commissioner of Kentucky's Depart-
ment of Mines and Minerals, could explain the discrepancy between in-
spection results and the condition of the mines at the time of the explo-
sions; only if someone tipped off the company that an inspection was immi-
nent. The UMWA attacked the practice of shooting from the solid, a techni-
que used at the sites of the mine disasters.74 
The day after the question of violations at Topmost and Craynor was rais-
ed by the UMWA, Kentucky's Governor John Y. Brown Jr. issued executive 
order 82-75, appointing eighteen men to the Governor's Review Commis-
sion on Deep Mine Safety. the first meeting of the commission was held the 
day the executive order was signed. The commission issued its final report 
on February 24, 1982, less than a month later. The extreme speed was man-
dated by the need to advise the In session 1982 General Assembly of the 
needs for changing "current laws and regulations." 
It is worth noting that Willard Stanley, Brown's Commissioner of the Ken-
tucky Department of Mines and Minerals, had been a member of the 1976 
Deep Mining Safety Commission. As the previous commission had done, 
the new commission used the subcommittee system-in this case, cover-
ing: 
a. solid shooting 
b. state programs, personnel and mine related accidents 
c. state mining laws. 
Perhaps reflecting the rift between Glenn Freeman and Governor Carroll 
in 1976, though two legislators were commission members, state senator 
Benny Ray Bailey nor state representative Herbert Deskins Jr. chaired sub-
committees. As in 1976, the single representative of the academic com-
munity (Joseph Malesky, Pikeville College mining instructor)75 chaired a 
subcommittee. Two of the three UMWA representatives had attended 1976 
public meetings-Ernie Justice (at Pikeville) and Joseph " Hugh" Jones (at 
Cumberland). Though Everett Brown of Pikeville, Executive Secretary of 
Coal Operations and Associates, was not involved In 1976, the organization 
which "represents the small Independent operations in Pike County, and to 
a small extent the surrounding counties" had made its presence known 
then.76 
Well covered open hearings on solid shooting were held February 3 at 
Martin, Kentucky. Additional hearings were held February 11 at Hazard 
Community College; and February 17 at the University of Kentucky. The 
committee charged with Kentucky Mining Laws and Regulations held two 
public hearings at the University of Kentucky (February 5 and 17, 1982) 
while the Subcommittee on State Programs and Personnel and Mine 
Related Acc idents held a single open hearing at University of Kentucky 
February 5, 1982. 
Small scale operators felt threatened. Ronnie Hatfield of Drift testified 
that:77 
If all the precautions are taken, it's safe. The proper use of 
handling of explosives should be the topic here today, not the 
method of mining. 
To which Morris Isaac, supervisor of a " mostly family mine" added his 
" Amen." "The reason I'm concerned, " he declared, "is that solid shooting 
means jobs."78 The Floyd County Times editorialized:79 
If the " shooting from the solid" is eliminated, the small coal 
operation will cease to exist. The cost of cutting machines, con-
tinuous miners and such equipment Is too great. In that event, 
only strong, well-financed companies, many of which have out-of-
state ownership, would be able to operate. 
This contingency, nevertheless, will not justify a shooting 
practice if it, indeed, is found to invite disaster. But it does justify 
the closest scrutiny and the best thinking before such a stern 
measure is put into effect. 
The editorial made several other points, namely that: 
One gets the feeling that those who were victims in last week's 
explosion died despite their best efforts to practice safety. For 
these victims included the owners themselves of the mine; their 
lives were at stake. Neglect of employees' safety cannot, In this 
case, be ascribed to management. 
At best, coal mining can never be a safe occupation. Nature 
itself can be said to rebel as the removal of coal creates a huge 
vacuum deep in the interior of a mountain. The imponderables 
outweigh man's knowledge. 
No one knows this better, perhaps, than Kentucky's commis-
sioner of mines and minerals, Willard Stanley, whose dedication 
to mine safety is unquestioned. 
The rash of coal mine tragedies may well have been the chief factor forc-
ing the Reagan administration to return half of its proposed $4 million cut in 
the MSHA budget. Indeed an additional $15 million was proposed for 1983. 
According to the Lexington Herald: 80 
The impact in the coal fields should be beneficial, if for no 
other reason than a change in attitude on the part of miners and 
mine operators. For if there was a cause-and-effect correlation 
between the scaling back of federal mine safety programs and 
the rash of disastrous accidents in recent months, the most 
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significant factor was probably the atmosphere that was produc-
ed by the cutbacks. 
When Washington shows less concern about mine safety, 
miners and mine operators begin to think they can cut corners 
and get away with it. During such times, there is obviously less 
danger of be ing cited and having to pay costly fines as a result of 
federal inspections. 
The fines are not the only monetary consideration involved. 
Time is money, and it takes time to put down the rock dust that 
reduced the risk of setting off the volatile coal dust so prevalent 
in the mines. It takes time to observe safe blasting techniques. 
So rock dust is forgotten, explosives are set off simultaneously in 
two or more adjacent coal seams-and miners die. 
The Lexington Herald-Leader reacted to Brown's Review Commission on 
Deep Mine Safety's report characteristically, with an editorial. The headline 
read Guidelines For Mine Safety: Is This Enough Protection? The editorial 
spoke of the key recommendations wh ich included:81 
. . . requiring mine operators to submit detailed blasting plans 
to the state Department of Mines and Minerals before " shooting 
from the solid" would be allowed. In addition, there would be in-
creased penalties for safety violations relating to the use of ex-
plosives. Mines could be temporarily closed on the first and 
second violations. Any further violations would result in revoca-
tion of the mining permit. .. 
Other recommendations of the commission include the forma-
tion of a "SWAT" team to find and close down illegal mining 
operation; tighter standards for certification of mine inspectors, 
miners and mine foremen; adoption of a law that protects the 
right of a miner to refuse to operate unsafe equipment; continua-
tion (at state expense) of the training and analysis programs 
formerly paid for by the federal government; and stricter enforce-
ment of ex ising safety laws and regulations. 
All of these recommendations-with the glaring exception of 
allowing simultaneous blasting of two coal seams-have merit . 
The fact that it will cost the state a couple of million dollars a year 
to put the recommendations into effect should not be a deterrent. 
As state Public Protection and Regulation Secretary Tracy 
Farmer put it, "I think when you are talking in terms of lives, $1 
million is not too much money." 
However, adoption of all these recommendations does not end 
the issue. As noted earlier, the commission declined to address 
some of the more controversial proposals. These include hiring 
more state inspectors, conduct ing more inspections, imposing 
fines for safety violations, and establishing a point system for 
miners similar to that used to revoke driver's licenses. 
The Herald-Leader was disturbed by the lack of attention given to the 
issue that had attracted most of the media attention and controversy, solid 
shooting. For surely: 
If Kentucky is not yet ready to join most other mining states in 
banning "shoot ing from the solid," it certainly should be ready to 
impose more restrict ions on this inexpensive, but dangerous, 
method of mining in which explosives are used to break up coal 
for extraction from underground mines. 
The closing paragraphs of the editorial blasted the solid shooting pro-
cess, declaring that: 
. .. there is the question of "shooting from the solid" itself. 
When a mining method is so dangerous that almost all other min-
ing states have banned it, its continued use here must-at the 
very least-be suspect. Serious consideration should be given to 
banning "shooting from the solid." 
Admittedly, that would mean a financial hardship for small, 
family mines (such as those that have experienced the recent 
disasters). However, Tracy Farmer's remark is singularly ap-
propriate: How much is a human life worth? 
The Mine Safety Issue in 1982, unlike 1976, refused to fade away. This 
was caused both by events and by Courier-Journal decision to put its 
resources, both of money and manpower, into the issue. This resulted in a 
nine part series in May entitled "Dying for Coal" and a three part " Update" 
in late November.82 
March 1, the Courier-Journal carried a story entitled "1 981 Coal-Mine 
Death Rate Nation's Highest Since 1975", and approximately a month later 
the Herald-Leader reported that " Critics Link Mine Deaths to Reduced 
Federal Vigilance."83 Perhaps the potentially confrontational nature of the 
issue and the shock value of the deaths helped sustain the safety issue this 
time. Obviously 1982, unlike 1976, was not a presidential election year, leav-
ing more space for non-presidential items including mine safety. 
The Courier-Journal effort turned up some interesting statistics. For ex-
ample, in Kentucky, the average age of the miner who died from 1975-78 
was 33.4 years and their average experience was 8.3 years. However, in 
terms of working the particular mine where the individual died, the per-
centage who had been employed there for less than a year was 29% for 
1981, 34% for 1980. 
MSHA statistics indicated the fatality rate for mines with 10-19 workers 
was 62% above the national rate. The President's Commission on Coal 
reviewing underground fatalities between January 1978 and June 1979 
reported that 43% of the fatalities occurred in mines employing less than 
fifty persons which account for just 15% of underground work hours. A 
1979 Office of Technology Assessment study reported that the fatality 
rates at mines running less than 25,000 tons annually was ten times the na-
tional average.84 
Though the UMWA claims union mines are " far safer" than non-union 
mines, the Courier-Journal declared that "that assertion, although difficult 
to prove, is debatable, if not doubtful. " An Office of Technology Assess-
ment study found "no clear relationship is demonstrated between safety 
and unionization." This paralled the 1978 observations of Harvard 
economist Leslie I. Boden. The author was quick to add that under-
reporting of accidents by non-union mines was possible. 
In 85% of the accidents, a supervisor was either on the scene or had 
been so within the hour. More foremen and superintendents die "than roof-
bol ters or any other rank-and-file group." According to the 
Courier-Journal's analysis of 236 fatalities, based on federal reports, in ap-
proximately two-thirds of the cases, "mine management was either wholly 
or partially responsible" for the mishaps. That assessment was qualified by 
leading off with the words "while admittedly subjective" ... The article 
concluded with a quote from the president's coal commission about the 
prevention of mine accidents followed by the Courier-Journal's editorial 
comment:85 
"The safest underground coal mines ... are those in which the 
commitment of top management to safety is strong and well -
known; efforts to achieve good labor-management relations and 
open communication are practiced; regular equipment 
maintenance is performed, and training of miners in safe prac-
tices is stressed." 
If those conditions were the norm in U.S. coal mines, and if 
each miner viewed safe work habits as the life preserver that they 
45 
46 
are, there would be far fewer statistics like Kelly Wayne Scott [a 
casualty that the Courier-Journal spotlighted.] 
Inadequate training, a push for production, and mine equipment inap-
propriate for working conditions (though efficient in terms of production) 
were among other reasons given as causes for mine accidents. James M. 
Peay, supervisory engineering psychologist for the Bureau of Mines, stated 
bluntly that " mining-equipment design traditionally has been notorious for 
its lack of concern for its human operator." Indeed, a MSHA study of 1146 
shuttle car accidents during 1978-80 revealed that 148 of them were the 
result of poor visibi lity or inadequate over-head clearance.86 
An earlier article in the "Dying for Coal" series spoke of alleged cases of 
foremen being fired for following safety rules. As the paper phrased it: 
Top company officials talk safety outside, but there is another 
set of rules under the hill , according to many of those interview-
ed. Many times company executives don't know what's going on 
underground because they never go into the mines; many don't 
want to know, the foremen say. 
Indirectly that view was supported by the following:87 
There are two sets of rules. "Outside they tell you to go by the 
book, but you can't produce high volume coal with a rule book," 
one Martin County section foreman said. 
Raymond A. Bradbury, president and general manager of Mar-
tin County Coal, says the biggest obstacle to making coal mines 
safe is the failure of company officials and foremen to insist on 
safety. 
Bradbury said his experience in hiring miners who have worked 
at other mines has been that they must be retrained in their at-
titudes toward safety rules. 
" We ask them leading questions .. . whether they go under un-
supported top. And they'll say,"We've been told never to do it if 
an inspector is there. We tell them right now that we don't do it. 
And we'll have it no other way." 
"They look amazed somewhat. I can tell," Bradbury said. 
"Coal can be mined safely and without getting people ki lled or 
injured." 
Martin County has demonstrated the importance of company 
attitudes toward safety by producing more than 8 million tons of 
coal at its two underground mines without a miner being killed 
and with a lost-time injury rate of less than one-half the national 
average over a 10 year period, company officials say. 
Mine operators and foremen insist that the last thing they want 
is to have a miner killed or seriously hurt. 
A mine death means a bevy of state and federal inspectors, 
days without working and probably specially assessed fines. 
Beyond that many operators are friends or relatives of their 
miners. 
It should be noted that Martin Coal Company's No. 1-C mine scored 784 
(or 13th) on the list of 23 rated Eastern Kentucky mines in 1977. The score 
was above the 700 national average but substantially below the leaders.88 
In 1977, the anticipated Keystone in the arch of mine-safety training, was 
approved by Congress, but did not live up to expectations. Pike County 
Judge-Executive Paul Patton declared, "I am as convinced now as when I 
served on the (1976) deep-mine safety commission that training of the work 
force is the major problem."89 
Though the Lexington Herald did not produce a mine-safety series, it did 
vent its concern in editorial form, with an attack on federal laxness:90 
Mine Safety? In Washington, They've Forgotten About It 
The recent, and horrifying, increase in fatal coal mine ac-
cidents emphasizes once again the casual disregard with which 
some miners and mine operators view minimum safety stan-
dards. Sadly, each investigation into an accident seems to point 
to the same conclusion: The tragedy could have been avoided if 
safety procedures had been followed. 
It has long been known that safety is given short shrift in the 
coal fields. Federal and state rules are ignored by operators who 
take the attitude that paying fines for safety violations is just 
another expense of doing business-a minor annoyance. And 
miners under pressure to produce take short cuts that only 
shorten their lives. 
Now, a report by the inspector general of the U.S. Department 
of Labor shows that the federal government itself has con-
tributed to this dangerous indifference to safety. In short, the 
report tells us the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration 
has been lax in collecting the fines for citations issued by the 
agency's inspectors. 
According to the report, one part of the problem is that the 
department's attorneys are willing to settle for " a fraction" of the 
assessed fines. As a result, the report concluded that mine 
operators " have no incentive to pay the penalty." Another part of 
the problem is that U.S. attorney's office, 817 cases involving 
penalties of more than $347,000 had to be dropped because the 
statute of limitations on the violations had expired. 
With that kind of record, is it any wonder that coal mine 
operators have a tendency to ignore MSHA rules and regula-
tions? 
But while the inspector general 's report suggested that MSHA 
develop new procedures designed to show that it is serious 
about processing citations and collecting fines, the agency's 
own recent actions give the impression that enforcement of safe-
ty laws will be even more relaxed in the future. 
By its recent adoption of a flat $20 penalty for all " minor" in-
fractions, the MSHA has added to the perception that paying 
fines for safety violations is only a business expense. And it is 
contemplating even more changes, including elimination of 
follow-up inspections for minor violations, and a provision for is-
suing " notices of violations" instead of citations. (The notices 
would not involve any fine at all). 
Such backward steps on the enforcement of safety laws are 
hardly the proper response to the recent increase in mining ac-
cidents, and the findings of the inspector general's report. By tak-
ing those steps, the MSHA will only encourage more mine 
operators and miners to ignore minimum safety standards, and 
the result will be a further increase in the death toll from mine ac-
cidents. 
In short, the Mine Safety and Health Administration is a 
misnomer. It is indifferent to safety and dangerous to the health 
of miners. 
Eight days after the 14th anniversary of the Farmington Disaster, the 
Courier-Journal began running a three part update of "Dying For Coal." The 
explosion season had arrived, but this time the articles were timely solely 




Many mine operators and government inspectors express 
doubt that the bleak coal market wi l l lead to an increase in the 
number of dead and maimed miners. 
Many miners are not so sure, however, and some admit to 
thinking more-and being told by their bosses to think 
more-about Friday's paycheck than about safety regulations. 
"I th ink a lot of them-especially now-think you 've got to get 
the coal out, or we're going to close down," said Ron Clothier of 
Beaver Dam, a safety committee-man at a Peabody Coal Co. 
mine. 
"If they have something wrong, they wait until the end of the 
shift to get it fixed-which is fine until somebody gets hurt." 
But " let a miner get hurt, and I've heard the foreman say, 'Old 
George should have known better than that. ' " 
On the positive side, according to the same source: 
Kentucky has gotten tougher with mines using the under-
ground blasting process known as shooting from the solid and 
with wildcat operators who neglect to observe such legal niceties 
as obtaining a license. 
The federal Mine Safety and Health Administration has added 
nearly 150 inspectors and assigned many of them to Eastern 
Kentucky. 
Drillers and shot-fires must be certified by the state, and both 
are required to have at least one year of on-the-job experience. 
Kentucky Mines and Minerals Commissioner Willard Stanley 
estimates that 90 percent of the solid shooting mines have im-
proved their blasting practices. And sales of rock dust and stem-
ming-which keeps explosive charges confined within the coal 
face where they are set off-have increased. 
Excessive amounts of highly volatile coal dust triggered the ex-
plosions at both Topmost and Carynor, and the state has since 
refined its technique for sampling the amount of dust present in 
any given mine. 
No longer are haked-eye surveys relied upon to determine 
whether adequate amounts of rock dust have been used to sup-
press coal dust below potentially explosive levels. 
And people who collect and analyze dust samples now have 
been assigned to each of the department's six regional offices. 
In a related story the Courier-Journal trumpeted a conclusion of the Na-
tional Research Council, namely that safety and production do mix and mix 
well:92 
" Overall mines with highest productivity have lower injury 
rates than do less-productive mines . . . Productivity and safety 
are compatible qualities in underground coal mine." 
There is a widespread belief among coal-industry executives, 
the council found, that safety and productivity are incompatible. 
Stress safety and productivity suffers. Resources devoted to 
safety are resources taken away from production. 
That belief is analogous to the Depression era article of faith that "Paint 
don't mine no coal ,"93 an idea that ignored the psychological, morale side 
of productivity. The Courier-Journal update came close to debunking the 
idea of the efficiency of union safety committees, declaring that:94 
Although miners are quick to cite the union safety committee 
as their most powerful ally underground, the power and effec-
tiveness of those committees frequently is diluted by recalcitrant 
workers, unqualified committee members and family ties in small 
mines that discourage vigourous challenges to safety infrac-
tions. 
The year 1983 was almost devoid of mine safety news in the Kentucky 
press, no doubt in part brought on by a dramatic drop in both accidents and 
death. The nationwide total of 70 deaths marked the first time-since 
records were first kept in 1869-that the national total was less than 100. 
Not only that, but this was the second year of decrease in a row (1982 = 122, 
1981 = 153).95 Was there a correlation between layoffs and the drop? 
Perhaps this was a statistical fluke, akin to rolling snake eyes in a dice 
game. 
MSHA spokesman Frank O'Gorman credited the miners for making safe-
ty programs work. " The difference is," he added " that there is no one in-
volved in mining now who is not aware of the need for safety and safety 
training. There's no longer a carelessness on the part of operators or 
miners."96 Such self-confidence proved misplaced. Indeed, in nine days in 
January, there were four separate fatal accidents in Kentucky, an amount 
equal to one-third of 1983's total for the year. 
Particularly disconcerting was the fact that 50% of the accidents were 
due to roof falls. Willard Stanley, Kentucky's Commissioner of Mines and 
Minerals, had been pleased that but one-third of the state's fatalities were 
due to roof falls vs. a national average between 50 and 60%. He felt Ken-
tucky's lower roof fall ratio was due to a 1982 decision to add roof control 
specialists to each of Kentucky's five inspection districts. 97 
Within a week, a pre-planned Lexington, Kentucky, meeting with mining 
officials from nine states occurred. In the intervening week, a fifth Ken-
tucky mine death was added to the tally. David Zegeer, assistant secretary 
of labor for mine safety and health, declared:98 
"We're getting to the point where, no matter how well you 
engineer a property, no matter how well you enforce the rules, 
regulations and laws, you have to consider the fact that there are 
500,000 people in the mining industry in this country. We're get-
ting to the point where we have to work on these human factors, 
whoever's at fault." 
The safety analyst program, begun in 1977 in Kentucky, the purpose of 
which is "to observe and teach accident prevention to individual miners on 
the job" was deemed a national model. As Zegeer put it: 
We've seen Kentucky as an example hoping that the other 
states will pick it up. Our responsibility is to enforce the federal 
law .. . 
Beyond that, we will work with the mining community in train-
ing to help the companies that can 't help themselves (adding that 
the MSHA did not want to compete with private consultants). 
If a mine has a ventilation problem, for example, and can't cope 
with it, it 's much better for us to go help them solve the problem 
than to wait for an explosion to go in and recover the bodies and 
investigate and write some report on what happened. 
In April , both Oklahoma and Tennessee lost primacy over surface mining. 
In Tennessee, the $14,000 salary for inspectors proved insufficient and 
" local health folks" took up the slack. 99 Meanwhile, in Kentucky, Judge 
Joseph B. Kennedy accused federal mine safety inspectors in Eastern Ken-
tucky of dereliction of duty for failing to cite a MAPCO subsidiary, Pontiki 
Coal Company's No. 2 mine, for excessive dust the day they appeared on 
the scene. MSHA supported their inspectors.100 
This would have been the end of it, probably, had the administrative law 
judge, characterized by the Courier-Journal as " combative and controver-
sial" let things stand. But as the Louisville paper put it: 101 
In a series of well-publicized legal documents, Kennedy 




"Confidential informants of known reliability," he wrote on 
May 14, had told him of a payoff system in which companies were 
getting favored treatment, including warnings of upcoming in-
spections and a "wholesale" reduction in the number of 
citations. 
Kennedy, who tries mine-safety disputes for an independent 
government commission, has refused to public ly identify his 
sources. 
He to ld the Courier-Journal that he first had to have a written 
agreement promising him and the sources anonymity and indem-
nifying him against lawsuits-a condition the newspaper would 
not meet. 
But in an effort to assess the validity of Kentucky's sensational 
charges-which have been referred to the Just ice Depart-
ment-the Courier-Journal conducted its own investigation. 
The Courier-Journal used statistics from ten districts across the nation 
for significant and substantial citations (low: Barbourvil le, KY 13.0%; high: 
Pittsburgh 53.3%), special assessments (low: Pikeville, KY 0.0%; high 
Morgantown, WV: 2.8%), citations vacated (low: Vincennes, IN 0.2%; high: 
Denver, CO 14.0%) to indicate sharp regional differences. As the paper 
phrased this finding : 
Enforcement from one MSHA district to another-even from 
office to office in the same district-differs greatly. Such 
disparities may promote the appearance that something is amiss, 
even if it isn't. 
The decline of fines from $16 million during the last fiscal year under the 
old system to $6.3 mi llion under a more lenient system two years later rais-
ed questions and eyebrows. Some inspectors became convinced their 
supervisors want fewer citations. As one inspector stated bluntly, " We're 
coal miners, but we're not stupid. Hit us with a ball bat a few times and we 
get the point. " A supervisor sent a memo in early March declaring: 
" Past experience has indicated to me that if an operator 
believes that a violation exists and it is considered to be a non-
S&S violation, that unit or area (of the mine) will not be shut down 
and the violation corrected, since it would on ly be a $20 fine if 
found by an inspector." 
In a separate article, the view was aired that inspectors sometimes felt 
they were "mere paper tigers" as in MSHA, " cooperation has replaced en-
forcement as the agency's watchword." 102 MSHA's view was different, 
summed up by the Courier-Journal as a belief " that they have simply struck 
a balance that achieves compliance without antagonizing the industry." 
The report suggested that "the line between cooperation and appeasement 
can be a fine one indeed, depending in part upon one's vantage point." 
The prime example given occurred in Martin County where inspector R.C. 
Hatter believed he was being hurried along. According to the article: 
Hatter's notes suggest why Martiki management might have 
wanted the inspection hurried along, and why he was determined 
not to do so: 
" It is only after (citations are issued) that much (corrective 
work) is done, and then it is not properly done or is done 
grudgingly." 
" I do not believe this operation's good faith is credible, nor the 
intent honorable, as many examples throughout this report show. 
They are not interested in preventive maintenance and do not 
work well, one department with another, and very little improve-
ment can be expected until persons are held totally accountable 
for acts of omission or commission as the case may be." 
Of the more than 90 citations issued to Martiki during the 
seven week inspection, about 65 were designated by the three in-
spectors as " sign ificant and substantial." 
That designation made them eligible for penalty assessments 
that are much higher than the $20 fines imposed by MSHA for 
non "S&S" violations. 
When Martiki contested them, however, MSHA supervisors 
either reduced or vacated-wiped out-more than a third of the 
" S&S" violations issued. 
The Courier-Journal "found no evidence to substantiate recent allega-
t ions of pay offs or other systematic corruption in MSHA." It did reveal two 
cases outside of Kentucky in which whistle-blowers (who objected to 
harassment or reported bribes) were punished for their efforts. 103 
Three days later the Courier-Journal editorial ized.104 
Mine Safety Agency Bespatters Its Own Image 
The best efforts of Courier-Journal reports to investigate 
charges against the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration 
turned up no evidence to support claims that systematic corrup-
tion exists in the agency. But that's not overly consoling. The 
verifiable facts show a situation that is only marginally better. 
The reports of writers Mike Brown and A.G. Dunlop showed an 
atmosphere in which charges and rumors of wrongdoing were 
bound to arise, whether true or not. Mine inspectors who hear 
more talk from the higher-ups about " cooperation" with safety 
law violators than about firmness are likely to feel that safety 
isn't the first order of business. When their citations frequently 
are thrown out or watered down-often without consultation with 
those who issued them-suspicions seem confirmed. 
And when enforcement practices vary widely from one district 
to another-and even from office to office in the same 
district-either the efficiency or the integrity of the whole pro-
cess is suspect. More than 53 percent of citations in MSHA's 
Pittsburgh District are classified as " sign ificant and 
substantial," compared to 13 percent in the Barbourville district. 
It's doubtful that anyone believes that this and other such 
disparities represent the real situation. 
Coal operators, on the whole, doubtless are better satisfied 
with MSHA's current emphasis on leniency and cooperation. In 
the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981", the industry was fined 
$16 million for health and safety violations. Under new pro-
cedures adopted for the following year, penalties totaled only 
$6.3 million. 
Maybe the new-found spirit of cooperation has reduced the 
need for fines, though many observers will be skeptical on that 
point. But the erratic way the penalties are levied-and the at-
titude of MSHA toward its own inspectors-leave little doubt that 
enforcement of mine health and safety rules still needs much im-
provement. 
In the next seventeen days two more Kentucky miners would 
die, bringing the year's total to sixteen, half of which were caused 
by roof falls.105 
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Conclusions And Thoughts 
- A dramatic decrease in fatalities occurred during the Nixon years, a 
legacy of the November 20, 1968, Farmington Disaster and the resultant 
legislation. 
- Emphasis on training and safety awareness in Kentucky came into its 
own as a legacy of the Scotia explosions of 1976. 
- Safety involves a variety of variables-environment, equipment, the 
human element, and all three elements need to be considered in a com-
prehensive program. 
- Fatalities occur to experienced miners who have "recently" changed 
the work they do in mines or are working in an unfamiliar mine. 
- Press attention respecting coal tends to be far more geared towards 
infighting within the UMWA, strikes, the state of the coal economy than in 
mine safety. 
- Often it takes a major multi-fatal ity disaster to attract the attention of 
the media though safety, by definition, cannot be a sometime thing. 
- As in the case of the Glenn Freeman controversy in 1976, conflict is 
more newsworthy than is information and understanding. 
- The UMWA cannot resist making a case for greater safety in union 
mines rather than making a case for safety per se.106 
- The safety analyst program, though promising, [and thanks to the in-
creased percentage of surface mining] does not need as many personnel as 
originally suggested in 1976, yet it is stil l substantially understaffed. 
- New machines are being designed to cut down the coal dust level , to 
provide safer roofing, etc.107 
- Stati stics are difficult to evaluate. For example, the years in a mine, 
years experience are sometimes given for those involved in accidents, but 
no similar figures are avai lable for the enti re workforce. Thus, it is next to 
impossible to determine if such statistics are significant or not. 
- The techniques and problems in obtaining safer mines changes from 
year to year. Enforcement, train ing, blitz inspect ions, raiding illegal opera-
tions, safety awareness. 
- The unmined mineral tax108 may be passed in 1986, 1988, or 1990. 
Perhaps a portion of those funds could be used for mine safety, thus tying 
funding to coal reserves rather than to political clout. 
- There is no simple answer to mine safety. 
- Variables such as change in the workforce, state of the coal economy 
appear significant. 
- The mining equivalent of defensive driving or of Murphy's Law needs 
to become instinctual. 
- Mine safety is not the primary concern of miners, the UMWA, nor of 
mine management, save for the brief period following explosions. this 
presents problems politically. 
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